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Executive summary
Basic cryptographic algorithms split into two families: symmetric algorithms, otherwise
known as secret-key algorithms, which normally require a key to be shared and simulta-
neously kept secret within a restricted group, and public-key algorithms where the private
key is almost never shared. From outside, this may give the impression that symmetric tech-
niques become obsolete after the invention of public-key cryptography in the mid 1970’s.
However, symmetric techniques are still widely used because they are the only ones that can
achieve some major functionalities as high-speed or low-cost encryption, fast authentication,
and efficient hashing. Today, we find symmetric algorithms in GSM mobile phones, in credit
cards, in WLAN connections, and symmetric cryptology is a very active research area.
There is a strong need for further research in this area. On the one hand, new industrial
needs are arising with the development of new application environments. For instance, the
demand for low-cost primitives dedicated to low-power devices is pressing. On the other
hand, progress in cryptanalysis may threaten the security of some existing and widely used
algorithms. A better understanding of recent attacks is then necessary for the evaluation of
existing primitives and for designing new and more secure ones.
This report gives a brief summary of some of the research trends in symmetric cryptogra-
phy at the time of writing, and the present report is the revision of Y2. The following aspects
of symmetric cryptography are investigated in this report:
• the status of work with regards to different types of symmetric algorithms, including
block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions and MAC algorithms (Section 1);
• the recently proposed algebraic attacks on symmetric primitives (Section 2);
• the design criteria for symmetric ciphers (Section 3);
• the provable properties of symmetric primitives (Section 4);
• the major industrial needs in the area of symmetric cryptography (Section 5).
Four major aspects have been identified and will be the focus of future work within the
Symmetric Techniques Virtual Lab in ECRYPT:
• A need for lightweight algorithms (especially for low-cost stream ciphers), dedicated to
hardware environments where the available resources are heavily restricted, arises from
industry. A dedicated ECRYPT workshop was held on that topic in July of 2005;
• The new attacks presented in the last two years on different commonly used hash func-
tions must be further investigated. The investigation and the development of new
general design principles for hash functions (and for MAC algorithms) is a major chal-
lenge. For this reason, a dedicated working group on that topic will be created within
the Symmetric Techniques Virtual Lab in ECRYPT;
• The recent development of algebraic attacks which may threaten both stream and block
ciphers is another important breakthrough. A better understanding of these techniques
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requires further works on several topics, such as the development and the study of
algorithms for solving algebraic systems of multivariate equations and the definition of
new design criteria related to these attacks.
• The development of new cryptanalytic techniques, such as algebraic attacks, has im-
portant consequences on the properties required for the elementary functions used in
a symmetric cipher. Therefore, there is a need for a clarification of all design criteria
which must be prescribed for a given application. The development of tools in order to
help the designers on this particular topic is being encouraged with ECRYPT.
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1 The Status of Symmetric Primitives
Here we review recent progress and open problems concerning different types of symmetric
primitives (block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions and message authentication codes).
One recent advance has been in the cryptanalysis of hash functions and in Sections 1.3 and 1.4
we investigate these new cryptanalytic results and consider their impact on the design of secure
hash functions and MAC algorithms. Finally, in Section 2 we focus on algorithms for solving
algebraic systems, which lie at the core of the recently proposed algebraic attacks against
block and stream ciphers.
1.1 Block ciphers
Block ciphers and stream ciphers are the two main classes of primitives encountered in sym-
metric cryptology. A block cipher can be described as a keyed pseudo-random permutation of
the {0, 1}n set of n-bit blocks, whereas a stream cipher can be described as a keyed pseudo-
random sequence over a finite alphabet (e.g. {0, 1}). The most usual block lengths for existing
block ciphers are n = 64 and 128 bits.
Block ciphers are typically slower than stream ciphers (20-40 cycles/byte) and require more
gates (5000-100,000). They form a very flexible building block, that can be used in various
modes of operation for confidentiality, message or entity authentication, one-way functions,
and hash functions. Block ciphers can even be efficiently converted to a stream cipher, if
used in an appropriate mode of operation (such as OFB), whereas the converse is not true.
Historically, block ciphers have been more prominent than stream ciphers in open standards
(DES, Triple-DES, AES), which may explain their popularity. They are used in many cryp-
tographic applications such as home banking, e-mail, authentication, key distribution and in
recent standards for encryption in mobile telephony, in hard disk encryption, and so forth.
Stream ciphers are preferred for selected applications with high performance or low power
requirements.
In the mid-1970’s, the block cipher standard DES (Data Encryption Standard) was pub-
lished by the US NBS (National Bureau of Standards, now NIST, National Institute for
Standards and Technology) [22]. DES has been the de facto world standard for encryption
until the mid-1990’s though in recent years the short key length of DES (56 bits) had under-
mined its security. In critical applications DES was often replaced by Triple-DES (threefold
iteration of DES). In addition, certain applications required a block length larger than 64
bits (both DES and Triple-DES operate on 64-bit blocks). Following an open competition,
the Belgian proposal Rijndael by Rijmen and Daemen, was selected as the AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard) [21] to succeed DES. More than half of existing security products cur-
rently use DES or variants of DES but many products will shift to AES and a large part
of the confidentiality of mass market applications of the cryptology will, in the future, be
based on the security of AES. Outside from DES, Triple-DES and AES, several other re-
cently proposed block ciphers are also used in numerous security products, for instance IDEA
(an algorithm previously used in the PGP file encryption software), RC5 (an algorithm used
in many S/MIME protected email products), MISTY1 and its variant KASUMI (which was
adopted encryption and message authentication algorithm for the UMTS third generation
mobile system), and numerous block cipher proposals have been evaluated as part of the
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European project NESSIE.
Studies made during the 25 years of existence of DES have led to important theoretical
advances in the public knowledge on the design of block ciphers. The discovery of differential
and linear cryptanalysis techniques [34, 8] in the early-1990’s represent (together with pre-
computation techniques such as Hellman’s Time-memory trade-off [24]) the most significant
advances in the analysis of DES and more generally of iterated block ciphers. Consequently
resistance to these attacks has become one of the main criteria in the analysis of the strength of
block ciphers. Some recently proposed designs, e.g. MISTY [35] and KASUMI (whose nested
structure exploits upper bounds of differential and linear transition probabilities established
by Nyberg and Knudsen [40], or constructions based upon the so-called decorrelation the-
ory by Vaudenay [47], offer provable resistance against basic forms of differential and linear
cryptanalysis.
Several cryptanalytic methods other than differential and linear cryptanalysis have been
discovered: higher order differential attacks, truncated differential attacks, interpolation at-
tacks, integral (saturation) attacks, impossible differential, boomerang, and rectangle attacks
can be more effective than usual differential techniques. Other attacks such as chi-square,
partitioning, and stochastic cryptanalysis, as well as attacks against key schedules, such as
sliding attacks and related key attacks can offer other avenues for the cryptanalyst. Although
formal proofs of security against these various classes attacks have not been systematically
developed for existing block ciphers, their existence is generally taken into account by the
designers of block cipher proposals, and an algorithm such as AES can be reasonably conjec-
tured to resist these attacks techniques (most of which are essentially statistical in nature).
While the only assertion one has for now is that there exists no feasible shortcut attack on
AES, it has been observed that the AES uses several algebraic structures, it cannot be entirely
precluded that further use of advanced algebraic techniques such as the use of Gröbner basis
computations, probabilistic interpolation, and quadratic approximations might not establish
weaknesses in AES [19, 39].
Outside from the study of various categories of attacks and of design methods to resist
these attacks, cryptologic research on block ciphers has been strongly influenced by the de-
velopment of unconditional security proof techniques which allows us to partially validate one
specific level of a block cipher construction or perhaps a mode of operation of a block cipher.
This security paradigm was proposed by Luby and Rackoff in 1988 [33] and later developed
by Patarin, Maurer, Rogaway, Bellare, Vaudenay and others. On one level, a cryptographic
construction is modeled as a pseudo random function (or permutation) generator, and this is
compared with an ideal (uniformly drawn) function or permutation generator with the same
input and output sizes. Pseudorandomness results allow us to partially validate block cipher
features such as the so-called Feistel structure of the DES construction, or to validate modes
of operation of block cipher such as the CBC MAC mode. The use of such techniques will
likely become more systematic in validating the structure of block ciphers or their modes of
operation.
1.1.1 Ongoing research directions
Some current research areas include the following.
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Cryptanalysis of AES and similar block ciphers. The AES algorithm is a simple and
elegant design and it is secure against attacks known to date; there are even some strong
heuristic arguments that differential and linear cryptanalysis do not apply. A first line of
research could be to further validate via a security proof that AES is secure against differential
and linear attacks and improved variants thereof, perhaps taking into account the difference
between probabilities over all keys and security for a particular key. The security of AES
could also be validated by studying in more depth the basic AES structure (SPN network),
and by trying to establish its soundness by further investigating pseudo-randomness and
super-pseudo-randomness of generic constructions following the AES approach.
A second line of research should be to investigate and develop new attacks that exploit the
algebraic structures present within the AES. While the AES is very elegant mathematically,
it is clear that this opens new lines of research for cryptanalysis, which require a longer term
effort. In this respect, a cryptographic algorithm is very different from other algorithms in
computer science: a “normal” algorithm that works correctly now, will also work correctly
in five years, and can only be improved. The security of a cryptographic algorithm with
fixed parameters such as AES can only degrade over time because the state of the art in
cryptanalysis develops. It is impossible at this stage to indicate which types of attacks will be
successful against the AES, but we can make a few educated guesses. A first strategy could
be to extend the rather sophisticated methods (combining genetic algorithms with statistical
attacks) developed to attack hash functions to block ciphers. Another recently proposed
completely new idea is based on the use of systems of quadratic equations which might be
used to recover the key. For the time being, this approach has not been proved to be effective
(see the AES Security Report [20] for further details). However, fundamental research is
required to investigate the applicability of this new mathematical technique as well as other
algebraic attacks, such as probabilistic interpolation attacks.
New constructions and building blocks. New block ciphers that may offer specific
advantages over the AES (such as lower gate count, higher performance, very fast key setup,
very large block length, or enhancements in terms of provable security) need to be studied and
designed. An important example of an “alternative” block cipher to the AES is KASUMI,
which is being deployed in third generation phones, mainly for its low gate count, but it is
clear that other applications will need improved block ciphers as well. In this context, it is
important to explore block ciphers that have a structure completely different from DES and
AES. This will also require new approaches to cryptanalysis, similar to the new approaches
now being studied for AES.
Among the basic elementary building blocks used in block cipher constructions, only the
S-boxes design and the overall structure (Feistel scheme, Misty scheme, etc.) have been
extensively analyzed. Other building blocks such as: the linear part of S/P networks, the key
schedule, and the use of uniform rather than hybrid round structures have been much less
investigated until now.
Generic trade-off attacks. It was usually considered that the time-memory-data trade-
off attack was not a threat in the context of block ciphers since its precomputation time has
the same cost as the exhaustive search for the key (whereas the situation is known to be
very different for stream ciphers where a tradeoff involving data is available). However, it
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was recently shown that all the reasoning from the time-memory-data tradeoff attack against
stream ciphers [9] can be applied to block ciphers as a time-memory-key tradeoff [10]. This
attack requires several encryptions of a fixed plaintext under different keys. A comparison
between such attacks can be found in the AES Security Report [20, Chapter 4].
1.1.2 Open problems for block ciphers
Some open problems in the area of block ciphers include the following.
• Can a practical and efficient block cipher be constructed whose security can be di-
rectly and provably related to the intractability of a well identified and well studied
mathematical problem?
• Are there alternative construction strategies? Block ciphers are pseudorandom permu-
tations and generally result from the iteration of a one-to-one round function. Pseu-
dorandom n-bit to m-bit functions based upon the iteration of not one to one round
functions might also represent useful primitives: such functions could be directly used
for the purposes of authentication or key distribution, and modes of operation allowing
to encrypt data using such a primitive could also be easily defined. However, such con-
structions have not been well studied. Most constructions proposed until now proved
to be extremely weak, due to the existence of collision attacks and/or “ciphertext only”
attacks, and it would be useful to know whether simple and efficient constructions
avoiding such attacks can be found.
• How do we estimate an optimal (in terms of security) number of rounds for an iterative
cipher?
• Are there (applicable) attacks that are independent of the number of rounds, or are
polynomial in the number of rounds?
• Can we refine criteria on the properties expected from the linear (diffusion) part of
block ciphers with a substitution/permutation structure? These have been much less
studied than criteria governing the selection of S-boxes. For instance, it is easy to
determine stable subspaces of the linear part of a S/P block cipher, but the cryptanalytic
consequences of the existence of stable subspaces are not well known.
• Can we state the optimal properties for S-boxes? We still do not know if there exist
differentially 2-uniform bijective S-boxes with an even number of bits. We do not know
how many exist with an odd number of bits. The same questions might apply for linear
approximations. Algebraic properties such as large algebraic degree, no low degree
approximation, and no multivariate quadratic approximation might also need to be
taken into account (see Section 3). It is still hard to determine when higher differential
attacks apply. Should we try to design with all these aspects in mind?
• Are there new (and more powerful) attacks that use the data adaptively?
• Is it possible to develop block ciphers that are inherently more secure against certain side
channel attacks? Perhaps this can be done by using secret sharing-type techniques and
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one-way functions inherently within the design. This may lead to completely new designs
of block ciphers, that can be much faster than existing ones in environments where side
channel attacks are applicable. Implementation dependent attacks and performance
concerns can be improved by enhancing the cooperation between cryptographers and
the engineers that use block ciphers.
• Should we salt or tweak block ciphers, that is, add a public input for randomization?
This may result in simpler and more efficient modes, at the cost of more powerful attacks
against the basic primitive. This is an interesting trade-off to consider, which may bring
substantial improvements.
• It is still an open problem whether existing trade-off attacks, such as Hellman’s at-
tack, [24] are optimal.
1.2 Stream ciphers
While block ciphers are generally used to encrypt a block of characters of a plaintext message
using a fixed encryption transformation, a stream cipher encrypts individual characters of
the plaintext using an encryption transformation that varies with time. We often refer to
any stream cipher producing one output bit on each clock as a classical stream cipher design.
However other stream ciphers are word-oriented and may encrypt the plaintext as bytes or
larger units of data.
Typically we consider a binary additive stream cipher in which the keystream, the plain-
text, and the ciphertext are sequences of binary digits. The output sequence of the keystream
generator, z1, z2, . . . is added bitwise to the plaintext sequence m1,m2, . . ., producing the ci-
phertext c1, c2, . . .. The keystream generator is initialized through a secret key K, and hence,
each key K will correspond to an output sequence. Since the key is shared between the
transmitter and the receiver, the receiver can decrypt by adding the output of the keystream
generator to the ciphertext and obtain the message sequence, see Figure 1. This kind of
♠✲ ✲❄
keystream
generator
m1,m2, . . . c1, c2, . . .
z1, z2, . . .
Figure 1: A binary additive stream cipher.
stream cipher is known as a synchronous stream cipher.
Self-synchronising stream ciphers. The second type of stream cipher, the self-
synchronising stream cipher, is dedicated to contexts where data loss is less annoying that
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latency. For these ciphers, the encrypted message is sent in a long stream, and it is impor-
tant to be able to resynchronise the decryption even if part of the encrypted stream is lost.
However, discussions at the first ECRYPT State of the Art of Stream Ciphers workshop sug-
gested that there was little real demand for this second type of keystream generators which
are no longer used today, at least in industry. Instead of sending an encrypted message in a
long stream, messages are now split into a number of packets that are acknowledged by the
receiver, and if some packet is lost it is resent. Thus, most stream ciphers have three different
inputs: the message, the secret key, and an initial value (IV, which may correspond to the
packet number). They operate in two separate steps: first, the secret key and the initial
value are used to generate the keystream sequence. Then, the keystream sequence obtained
is bitwise combined with the plaintext by a XOR and the result is the ciphertext. Recent
works point out that the IV loading algorithm plays a major role in the performance and in
the security of a synchronous stream cipher. There are many open issues related to the initial
value in the design of stream ciphers: how can the IV loading algorithm be taken into account
in the classical attacks which require a long keystream segment (e.g. correlation attacks)?
Can we extend available security proofs for the keystream generation to stream ciphers with
an initialization value?
Synchronous stream ciphers. The design goal for a synchronous stream cipher is to
produce a secure keystream where we are typically concerned about two types of attacks:
• Key recovery attacks: The cryptanalyst tries to recover the secret key K.
• Distinguishing attack: The cryptanalyst tries to determine whether any arbitrarily se-
lected key stream z1, z2, . . . , zN has been generated by a given stream cipher or whether
it is a truly random sequence. If we can build a distinguisher, i.e. a box that implements
some algorithm, to correctly answer the above question with high probability, then we
have a distinguishing attack.
It is clear that a distinguishing attack is weaker than a key recovery attack. Whereas a key
recovery attack allows the attacker to get access to any possible plaintext information he or
she wants, the distinguishing attack can give only some limited amount of information to the
attacker. For example, if the plaintext message is one out of two possible, the distinguishing
attack can tell the attacker which of the two was transmitted.
Today, there is an extensive theoretical knowledge on stream ciphers and on various design
principles for stream ciphers. Often the basic building block of stream cipher design is the
Linear Feedback Shift Register and as a consequence much stream cipher design work has
focused on the ideas of modifying, combining, and disrupting LFSR sequences so as to derive
secure keystream generators. There are however some other prominent ciphers that do not
use LFSRs, the obvious example being RC4.
LFSR-based designs. Many stream ciphers are built around the Linear Feedback Shift
Register. Within this class of ciphers there are a variety of design approaches.
A combination generator is a key stream generator for stream cipher applications. The
idea of the combiner generator is to destroy the inherent linearity in LFSRs by using several
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LFSRs in parallel. The outputs from these n parallel LFSRs u1, . . ., un are combined by a
nonlinear Boolean function, denoted by f(·) and called a combining function. The output
from the nonlinear function is the keystream and the output symbol at time instant t is
denoted by zt, this symbol is calculated as
zt = f(u
1
t , u
2
t , . . . , u
n
t ) ,
where uit denotes the output bit from LFSR i at time instant t.
It is possible to consider the constituent sequences u1, . . ., un as being formed from suc-
cessive stages of a single LFSR. In this case the combining function f(·) is known as a filter
function and the corresponding stream cipher as a filter generator. In both the case of the
combination and the filter function, however, it is possible to set out certain desirable prop-
erties of the function f(·) so as to (hopefully) derive secure keystream generation. However,
as new attacks are developed, it is likely that new design criteria may need to be added.
The combination and filter generators are very popular designs, but the consistent align-
ment of internal registers as the output is generated might make the job somewhat easier
for the cryptanalyst. One way to try and thwart such attacks is to use what is termed clock
control. Again the stream cipher would be based around LFSRs, but instead of the subcom-
ponents being clocked at the same time, the decision to update a particular register, or the
decision as to how far to move that register at any given instance, is dependent on some other
component of the cipher. Such ciphers are referred to as clock control ciphers and there are
many different designs in use today.
Table driven stream ciphers. Another major class of stream cipher design is that of the
table driven cipher. The classic example is RC4 which has a massive state space which is
slowly—but continually—evolving. While some weaknesses in the output function of RC4
have been noted, table-driven stream ciphers can offer significant performance advantages
though with some potentially large implementation cost in hardware. Their design is often
such that they have little in common with LFSR-based design and so, as a result, are often
immune to classical LFSR-based analysis. However they can become susceptible to dedicated
attacks.
Other types of underlying components instead of LFSRs have also been proposed, such
as T-functions [30], FCSRs (Feedback with Carry Shift Registers) [29, 2] or some families of
NFSRs (Nonlinear Feedback Shift Registers). New research results on these building blocks
have been obtained recently. For instance, linear binary relations have been exhibited on
consecutive iterations of some T-functions [38].
1.2.1 Typical stream cipher analysis
Just as there are a few different families of stream cipher designs, it is possible to group
together the most important types of stream cipher analysis. Since LFSRs are used widely
in stream cipher design, it is perhaps unsurprising that analysis exploiting the algebraic
properties of the shift register is very popular. Consequently the use of linear complexity, the
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, the linear complexity profile, and other advanced but related
topics in the analysis of stream ciphers is well-known. There is a large collection of results on
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the properties of the final sequences derived from some ensemble or combination of constituent
LFSR components.
Divide and conquer attacks. A very generic set of attacks are referred to as divide-
and-conquer attacks. These rely on the fact the the keystream generator is built out of
several, rather weak, components. As an example, suppose that we have a nonlinear combiner
generator consisting of n different LFSRs and that these LFSRs have lengths L1, L2, . . .,
and Ln. Then the total number of different possible initialization values of these LFSRs is
∏n
i=1(2
Li −1). However if we assume that there is some weakness in the generation process so
that the properties of some individual component register leaks into the keystream produced
(the usual example is that there exists some correlation between the keystream and the output
of one of the LFSRs) then one can potentially break the keystream generator one component
at a time. Thus, under a known keystream attack and under the assumption that we have
sufficiently many keystream bits, we might be able to try to identify the correct initial state
of each LFSR in turn. If so, we might be able to find the initial states of all the LFSRs in
at most
∑n
i=1(2
Li − 1) trials which is much less than ∏ni=1(2Li − 1) we might have expected.
While the exact property exploited to identify the component LFSR might vary from cipher
to cipher, there are a variety of design principles that might be employed to protect the cipher
against a range of divide-and-conquer attacks. It is also noteworthy that divide-and-conquer
attacks may also apply to the combination of NFSRs [26].
Correlation attacks. One way to launch a divide-and-conquer attack is to exploit what
is called the correlation between an output sequence and one of the constituent components.
Certainly basic versions of LFSR-based stream ciphers are vulnerable to correlation attacks.
These techniques were introduced by Siegenthaler [46] and in the original correlation attack,
the initial state of the target LFSR was recovered by an exhaustive search: the value of the
correlation enables to distinguish the correct initial state from a wrong one since the sequence
generated by a wrong initial state is assumed to be statistically independent of the keystream.
Thereafter, fast correlation attacks were introduced by Meier and Staffelbach in 1988 [36, 37].
They avoided the need to examine all possible initializations of the target LFSR by using
efficient error-correcting techniques. But, they required the knowledge of a longer segment of
the keystream. In practice, the most efficient fast correlation attacks are able to recover the
initial state of a target LFSR of length 60 for an error-probability p = 0.4 in a few hours on
a PC with around 106 bits of keystream.
Algebraic attacks. A recently developed—and powerful—type of analysis has been intro-
duced in [18]. The basic idea behind the algebraic attack is very simple. First, the cryptanalyst
sets up a system of equations including key bits and output bits. Second, the cryptanalyst
solves this system to recover key or keystream information. Solving a system of linear equa-
tions is easy using, for instance, Gaussian elimination. However a good cipher always contains
a non-linear part, so the equations will be non-linear, that is of degree greater than one. If
the system of equations is very over-defined then the equation set can still be solved using
techniques such as linearization, or other methods such as Gröbner bases. However, since the
complexity of solving such equations grows exponentially with the degree of the equations,
the cryptanalysis is keen to identify low degree equations relating bits of the output and the
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internal components of the cipher. A variety of techniques have been proposed to help the
cryptanalyst but their effectiveness tends to be somewhat cipher specific. In 2003 a significant
improvement was proposed and the fast algebraic attack was introduced [17]. The idea was to
reduce the degree in the equations using an additional pre-computation step. This step was
later improved in [1]. It is noteworthy that there are some important limitations to algebraic
attacks. However, generally speaking, they have been very effective in the analysis of several
stream ciphers to date. This will be discussed more in Section 2.
1.2.2 Research directions and open problems
Recent progress in research related to algebraic attacks has given us new design criteria
for stream ciphers. To add to past conditions related to the non-linearity and correlation-
immunity of combining or filter functions we can add properties that aim to thwart algebraic
attacks. As the state-of-the art progresses more conditions will presumably be added.
One interesting consideration for stream ciphers is their future desirability. At the first
ECRYPT State of the Art of Stream Ciphers workshop in October 2004 [41], Adi Shamir
expanded on some thoughts originally presented at the 2004 RSA Security Conference. These
were concerned with the future need for stream ciphers with, it seems, block ciphers being
perfectly adequate for use in all but a few niche areas. These niche areas were identified as:
• Exceptional encryption performance in software, where the luxury of additional hard-
ware is not available to speed up encryption.
• Any reasonable kind of encryption performance in hardware environments where the
available resources such as gate count or power might be heavily restricted. The extreme
example of this is provided by simple RFID tags.
Since it was unclear whether any stream cipher proposals particularly satisfied these two
requirements, the development of stream ciphers for these two environments has been encour-
aged within ECRYPT. This led to the eSTREAM project, which received 34 submissions in
April of 2005. A second workshop (SASC 2006) hosted by the Leuven University in Febru-
ary 2006 is dedicated to the security and the performance of these proposals.
In tandem with the search for lightweight stream ciphers, work within ECRYPT is em-
phasizing the need for lightweight algorithms in general. This was the focus of a dedicated
workshop that was hosted by the Graz University of Technology in July of 2005.
1.3 Hash functions
Hash functions, also known as message digests, are important cryptographic primitives. The
hash of a message can be compared with the fingerprint of a person. An important application
of hash functions are digital signature schemes, where instead of a signing the message itself a
short hash value representing that message is signed. The selection of a secure hash function
is therefore necessary to create a secure digital signature scheme. Here, security means a high
level of collision resistance. We assume that the reader is familiar with the notion of a hash
function and its basic properties.
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During 2004 and 2005, there was considerable progress in the cryptanalysis of hash func-
tions, to be more precise, in attacking the collision resistance of dedicated hash functions.
Several results on this topic were presented that drew a lot of attention: Biham and Chen
presented a new cryptanalytic method, the neutral bit technique [6] which they first applied
to find near-collisions of SHA-0. Joux, Carribault, Jalby and Lemuet applied this technique
to the full SHA-0 [27]. They also succeeded in finding collisions for significantly reduced
versions of SHA-1 [7]. In the same time, Wang et al. presented collisions for the functions
MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128, RIPEMD and SHA-1 [48, 51, 52, 50, 49], which they found using
another new technique.
In this section we will describe some background and details about these new kinds of
attacks. We will begin with some general framework, describing some common aspects of the
two attack methods and their main differences, before in the following subsections we will
describe some details of these attacks.
Notation. We will denote the message blocks by X, X ′ and the single words in these blocks
by Xi, i.e. we have X = (X0, . . . , Xk−1) where in most cases k = 16. The values resulting
from the message expansion which are used as inputs in the step operation are denoted by
Wi. By Xi ≪ s we denote the rotation (cyclic shift) of Xi by s bits.
As in the dedicated hash functions considered in this context usually only one register is
changed in each step, we can use a notation in which it is not necessary to distinguish which
of the registers actually used in an implementation is changed in a certain step. Therefore we
simply denote the (new) value of the register changed in step i by Ri. For example the step
operation of SHA-0 and SHA-1 then can be described as follows
Ri = (Ri−1 ≪ 5) + (Ri−5 ≫ 2) + φi(Ri−2, Ri−3 ≫ 2, Ri−4 ≫ 2) + Ki + Wi
where the (seemingly) additional rotations come from the fact that in each step additionally
one register is rotated by two bits.
1.3.1 General framework
Both techniques can be divided into two main parts. In the first part the general “attack
strategy”, a difference pattern, is chosen or determined. In the second part, which requires
usually a lot of time-consuming computations, the actual collisions, which conform to this
difference pattern, are determined.
Difference patterns. In a collision attack we are looking for two messages X and X ′ which
produce the same hash value. Therefore we have to correlate the computations that are done
when computing the hash value of X and the computations for the hash value of X ′. A
difference pattern is a sequence of differences, where each difference corresponds to one step
in these computations and is defined as a difference of a value from the computation for X
and the corresponding value from the computation for X ′.
We have to distinguish between input differences, which means differences in the message
words, or rather in the values Wi after the message expansion, and output differences, that
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is, differences appearing in the register values Ri after applying the step operations. We say
that a certain message conforms to a certain difference pattern (consisting of an input and
an output pattern), if processing this message and the message modified by the given input
pattern results in the given output pattern.
Another important distinction is that between modular differences, that is, differences with
respect to integer addition usually modulo 2n (where n is the register size in bits), and ⊕-
differences. This is also the most obvious difference between the two presented attacks. Biham
and Chen, based on the attack of Chabaud and Joux, talk only about ⊕-differences, whereas
Wang et al. mainly use modular differences for their attack and talk about ⊕-differences only
where necessary. But it is not easy to tell what is the more promising approach. Using
⊕-differences is easier if you use a linearized function, because then you can apply many
techniques from linear algebra or coding theory for example, but the problem is that you
have to transfer everything back to the original function afterwards. In contrast, modular
differences can be applied to the original function more easily but you cannot avoid also
looking at ⊕-differences in addition to handle for example the bitwise defined functions used
in the step operation.
1.3.2 The neutral bit technique.
The neutral bit technique by Biham and Chen is an improvement of the method used by
Chabaud and Joux to attack SHA-0 in [15]. Therefore we will first sketch the ideas of their
attack.
The Chabaud/Joux Attack on SHA-0. Chabaud and Joux use an approach with ⊕-
differences. But as it is nearly impossible to analyze the ⊕-difference behaviour directly in
the original step operation, they use an ⊕-linear approximation of the step operation, which
can be constructed by substituting all nonlinear parts (i.e. the modular additions and the
nonlinear, bitwise defined functions) by ⊕-additions. Then for this linearized function it is
easy to find difference patterns which lead to a collision.
Their idea to actually find collisions for the original function is to look for messages which
have the same difference propagation in the original function as in the linearized function, i.e.
applying the computed input difference pattern to this message results in the same output
difference pattern as in the case of the linearized function. Clearly, this cannot be true for
every message, but it is possible to deduce conditions from the difference patterns which
describe for which actual register values the difference propagation is the same.
Chabaud and Joux used some refined randomized search to find actual collisions: They
start, by repeatedly choosing random values for X0 and computing the first step until all
the conditions for R0 are fulfilled. Then they do the same with X1, the second step and R1
and so on up to X14, the 15-th step and R14. This can be done step by step, as the values
R0, . . . , Ri−1 are not influenced by Xi for i ≤ 15.
After having found this (first 15 words of a) message conforming to the first 15 steps, they
only choose random values for X15. This does not change the output difference pattern for the
first 15 steps, but produces a nearly random behaviour for the remaining steps. Thus mainly
the probability for fulfilling the conditions for these remaining steps is of importance for the
overall complexity of this attack. Of course, one can construct at most 232 different messages
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by choosing only X15 and hence, after a certain number of (unsuccessful) tries for X15 one
has to start from the beginning again by choosing new (random) values for X0, . . . , X14.
In [15] Chabaud and Joux describe a difference pattern which is fulfilled (in this sense)
with a probability of 2−61, that means their attack has a complexity of about 261.
Improvements by Biham and Chen. In [6] Biham and Chen improved this approach,
by looking for what they call neutral bits. Their idea is to increase this range of steps for
which you try to assure in advance (before the main part of the randomized search) that the
randomly chosen messages conform to the difference pattern. Clearly, if you look at more
than 15 steps, it is not possible anymore (as before) to change some message word arbitrarily
without having to fear that the output difference pattern has changed in these steps. But
this is where the neutral bits come into play:
Suppose we start with a message conforming to the given difference pattern up to some
step r. Then, a bit of the message is called neutral, if inverting it does not prevent the message
from conforming to the difference pattern up to step r. A pair of bits is called neutral, if this
is true for each of these bits and also if both are inverted simultaneously. Analogously, a set
of bits is called neutral if this holds for every subset of bits and it is called 2-neutral if each
pair of bits from this set is neutral. The maximum number of neutral bits for a given message
and step r is denoted by k(r).
Biham and Chen observed the following: If you have a 2-neutral set of bits, then after
inverting any subset of these bits the message still conforms to the difference pattern up to
step r with a probability of about 1/8. This means, starting from one initial message which
conforms to the difference pattern up to step r, you can produce about 2k(r)−3 messages which
also conform up to step r.
The number of producible message can even be increased by not only using neutral bits
but also simultaneous-neutral sets of bits. A set of bits is called simultaneous-neutral, if the
single bits of this set are not neutral, but inverting all the bits of the set simultaneously does
not prevent the message from conforming to the differential pattern up to step r. Thus, each
simultaneous-neutral set of bits can be viewed and used as a single neutral bit of a message,
probably increasing the number k(r).
To apply this method successfully, two things are required:
• deciding up to which step r the message has to conform to the given difference pattern
• finding messages with large 2-neutral sets of bits for a given message efficiently
For the first question you have to consider the probability P (r) that a randomly chosen
message conforms to the given difference pattern in the steps following step r. This probability
can be approximated very well from the conditions on the register values and r should be
chosen such that the number of producible messages 2k(r)−3 is about 1/P (r). Then there is
some non-negligible chance to find a collision by testing all the possible messages.
For actually finding large sets of neutral bits, Biham and Chen give a description how to
reduce this problem to finding maximal cliques in a graph. Although this is in general a NP-
hard problem, in the cases which are needed here this seems to work fine. Then to actually find
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messages which have large 2-neutral sets they suggest to perform some kind of local search.
They start with one message and compute the corresponding set of 2-neutral bits. Then
they test for some of the messages that can be produced by changing some certain subsets of
these bits (according to another observation they made) which of these new messages have a
larger 2-neutral set of bits and then take one of these messages as the new base message. By
repeatedly doing this process they can maximize (locally) the size of the 2-neutral set of bits.
In [6] Biham and Chen present collisions for an extended 82-step SHA-0 which were
found using the technique described. Additionally, applications of this method to reduced
version of SHA-1 are presented which result in collisions for up to 43 steps and the conclusion
that collisions for the last 53 steps should also be possible. Joux et al. (see [27]) applied
this technique to find actual collision for the original (80 step) SHA-0, by combining 4 such
differential patterns, constructed as described above, to produce a collision with two messages
consisting of 4 message blocks each.
1.3.3 The attacks of Wang et al.
Most of the details given in this section have been published in [48, 51, 52, 50]. The attacks
by Wang et al. differ from the method described above in one main fact, which is that they
mainly use modular differences instead of the ⊕-differences. This also means, that they do not
use a linearized approximation of the compression function but work directly on the original
step operation.
The recently published collisions produced by these attacks (see e.g. [48, 51]) are all
collisions for hash functions which use, as message expansion, a roundwise permutation in
contrast to the recursive message expansion which is applied in the SHA-functions. This
means that each of the message words is applied exactly once per round as one of the Wi.
(The l-th round of the compression function which uses message blocks of k words consists of
the steps (l − 1)k, . . . , lk − 1)
Finding the difference pattern. Similar as in the Chabaud/Joux attack Wang et al.
start by looking for a difference pattern, but in their attack the search for an appropriate
difference pattern is again divided into two separate parts: finding a useful input difference
pattern to have a “nice” differential behaviour in some part (e.g. in the last round), and then
find an appropriate output difference pattern for the remaining steps.
For example, in the MD4-attack, the input pattern is chosen such that randomly chosen
messages conform to the difference pattern in the last (i.e. third) round with a probability of
1/4. This can be done by looking at the step operation and choosing the input differences
such that they cancel each other after only a few steps. For example, the step operation of
the last round of MD4 can be described by the following equation (for step i):
Ri = (Ri−4 + (Ri−1 ⊕ Ri−2 ⊕ Ri−3) + Wi + Ki) ≪ si
Thus, if we induce a (modular) difference of 216 into X12 which is used as W35 in step 35,
we can see that in this step the value in the brackets produces also a difference of 216 (if we
suppose that in the steps before there have been zero output differences in the Ri). Then by
the rotation by s35 = 15 bits, this modular difference is rotated to either a difference of 2
31
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or 231 + 1, depending on one of the carry bits. Hence, with a probability of 1/2 (depending
on the actual values of the registers) the modular difference in R36 is 2
31. The advantage
of using this special modular difference is that it implies also an ⊕-difference of 231 in R35.
Thus in the next step
R36 = (R32 + (R35 ⊕ R34 ⊕ R33) + W36 + K36) ≪ 3
it follows that the ⊕-operation R35⊕R34⊕R33 results in a difference of again 231. By choosing
a difference of 231+228 for X2 = W36 we then get a difference of 2
28 in the brackets (the “231”s
cancel as we compute modulo 232) which is again rotated to a difference of 231 in R36 with a
probability of 1/2. Similar considerations can be done for the following steps to produce zero
differences. The complete difference propagation up to the collision in step 41 is illustrated
in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Difference propagation in last round of MD4.
By this consideration the complete input difference pattern is determined. To determine
the complete difference pattern it remains to find an output pattern for the first two rounds
which can be fulfilled given this input pattern. Wang et al. do this similarly to what we
just described by simply considering the step operation and the modular differences in the
registers. But the distinction now is that for this part there is no freedom in the choice of the
differences for the Wi anymore.
The only freedom of choice for the attacker comes from the fact that the relation between
modular differences and ⊕-differences is not one-to-one: A modular difference of 2k may,
for example, result in an ⊕-difference of 2k+l + 2k+l−1 + . . . + 2k with arbitrary values of
l ∈ {0, . . . , 31 − k}, depending on the actual register values, where small values for l are
more probable than large values. Thus by imposing conditions on these register values it
is possible to influence the ⊕-differences and thus the differences coming from the bitwise
defined functions in the step operation.
Using such techniques Wang et al. found the differential patterns together with a set of
conditions on the register values (similar to those in the Chabaud/ Joux attack) which were
used to find the actual collisions.
Basic and advanced modifications. To actually find messages conforming to this differ-
ential patterns, Wang et al. do what they call basic and advanced modifications. This means
they start with some arbitrary message and determine up to which step t the message con-
forms to the differential pattern. Then depending on the step t they do either a basic or an
advanced modification of this message to assure that the failing condition now is fulfilled.
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For the first round (step 0 ≤ t ≤ 15) such a basic modification simply means to adjust
the bits in the register Rt such that the conditions are fulfilled and to compute the message
word Xt which is necessary to produce this register value from the transformed equation of
the step operation (again for the example of MD4):
Xt = (Rt ≫ st) − Rt−4 − φt(Rt−1, Rt−2, Rt−3) − Kt
For later rounds (t ≥ 16) the necessary advanced modification is a little bit more sophisticated.
The general idea is, as before for the basic modification, to look for a message bit which can
be used to change the incorrect register bit. So, for example to correct the i-th bit in R16,
one could just invert the (i − 3)-th bit of X0, as can be seen from the description of step 16:
R16 = (R12 + φ16(R15, R14, R13) + X0 + K15) ≪ 3
But simply changing one bit in X0 would cause a lot of changes in the register values following
the first application of X0, probably causing that many already fulfilled conditions would
become false again. Thus the idea for an advanced modification is to invert this bit indirectly
and thereby cause as few changes as possible. For example, to change the (i − 3)-th bit as
required above, one could change the i-th bit of R0:
X0 = (R0 ≫ 3) − R−4 − φ0(R−1, R−2, R−3) − K0
To avoid further changes in other registers, one also has to adjust the message blocks X1, X2,
X3, X4 as they are used in the following steps which are also influenced by the change in R0:
Xt = (Rt ≫ st) − Rt−4 − φt(Rt−1, Rt−2, Rt−3) − Kt, t = 1, 2, 3, 4
Of course, this might also cause some conditions to fail now, but the probability that this
happens is much smaller, because the conditions include only register values and at least in
R0, . . . , R15 only one bit was changed by this advanced modification.
Another advantage of this advanced modifications is that there are many possibilities to
perform them. Hence, if one way causes some other condition to fail, there are other ways
one can try to correct one condition without loosing other conditions in return.
Wang et al. successfully applied this technique to break two hash functions, whose com-
pression functions consists of three rounds, namely MD4 and HAVAL-128. From looking at
the methods used it seems that functions with about three rounds can be broken by this
method in general, while functions with more than three rounds can only be broken if there
are special weaknesses which can be exploited.
For example they also found collisions for the RIPEMD-0 (the original RIPEMD from
[16]) which consists of two parallel strings of three rounds each, i.e. of six rounds altogether.
The weakness here is, that the two strings of three rounds are nearly identical in the design
such that it was possible to find one differential pattern for three rounds which can be applied
simultaneously to both strings.
The most interesting collisions presented by Wang et al. in [51] are the collisions for MD5
for which a little bit more effort was required, as MD5 consists of four rounds:
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Wang’s attack on MD5. The general idea is to use multi-block messages (similar to what
Joux et al. did to produce the SHA-0 collisions in [27]), i.e. messages for which the compression
function has to be invoked more than once. In the case of the MD5 attack the differential
pattern for the first application of the compression function leads to a difference vector of
(231, 231 − 225, 231 − 225, 231 − 225).
The differential pattern for the second application of the compression function starts with
these differences and leads to the following differences:
(231, 231 + 225, 231 + 225, 231 + 225)
Thus in the final computation step (which adds again the initial register values to the current
ones) these differences cancel such that there is a collision after these two applications of the
compression function.
The special weakness (compare also [14] on this) exploited in this attack is that it is
possible to induce a output difference of 231 by choosing some input differences and then this
output difference is propagated from step to step with probability 1 in the third round and
with probability 1/2 per step in a large part of the fourth round. Hence, it is possible to
find an input difference pattern which leads to an output difference pattern in round 3 and
4 which is fulfilled with high probability. Thus it is possible to attack even this four round
hash function with the method described earlier.
1.3.4 Research directions
So far we have described the research perspectives closely related to the state of the art for the,
w.r.t. practical applications most significant, class of MD4-type hash functions. The analysis
of other hash functions as Whirlpool and Tiger remains also a very important challenge.
Of course there are also fundamental questions for which answers are completely elusive
today, like how to design a fast and provable secure hash function. The process underlying
the design and analysis of hash functions today is more of trial-and-error character. Thus
investigation and development of new general principles similar to, for instance, the MD-
strengthening would be of great interest.
These open issues will be investigated by a new dedicated Working Group within the
Symmetric Techniques Virtual Lab in ECRYPT.
1.4 MAC algorithms
MAC algorithms compute a short string as a complex function of a message and a secret
key. In a communications setting, the sender will append the MAC value to the message.
The recipient shares a secret key with the sender. On receipt of the message, he recomputes
the MAC value using the shared key and verifies that it is the same as the MAC value sent
along with the message. If the MAC value is correct, he can be convinced that the message
originated from the particular sender and that it has not been tampered with during the
transmission. Indeed, if an opponent modifies the message, the MAC value will no longer be
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correct. Moreover, the opponent does not know the secret key, so he is not able to predict
how the MAC value should be modified.
The main security properties of a MAC algorithm is that one should not be able to forge
MAC values, that is, to predict values on new messages without knowing the secret key. A
second requirement is that it should be computationally infeasible to recover the MAC key
by exhaustive search, since an exhaustive key search allows for arbitrary forgeries.
1.4.1 Block cipher based MAC algorithms
The most popular MAC algorithms are the variants of CBC-MAC which are based on a block
cipher; in the past this has been mostly DES or triple-DES and currently AES is becoming
more popular. Since the mid 1990s, constructions based on hash functions such as HMAC
have been introduced on the Internet [3].
There exist several security proofs for CBC-MAC and variants (Bellare, Krawczyk and
Rogaway [5], Petrank and Rackoff [43], Vaudenay, Maurer, Black and Rogaway [12]). Most
of these proofs reduce the security of CBC-MAC to the assumption that the underlying block
cipher is a pseudo-random function. Moreover, the best advantage an attacker has to break
the system that can be shown in this case is on the order of q2 ·m2/2n, with q the number of
chosen texts, m the number of blocks in each message, and n the block length of the block
cipher.
If CBC-MAC is used with a pseudo-random function, the best known attack by Preneel
and van Oorschot [44] has advantage q2 ·m/2n. Recently, Rogaway has pointed out some small
flaws in the old proofs and has presented a new security proof starting from the assumption
that the underlying block cipher is a pseudo-random permutation. He obtains an advantage
q2 · m/2n. If CBC-MAC is used with a pseudo-random permutation (as this is done in
practice), the best known attack by Preneel and van Oorschot [44] has advantage q2/2n.
This leads to the following open problems:
• Try to close the gaps between the best known attack and the security bound; it seems
likely that in both cases this can be achieved by tightening the proof and getting rid of
a factor of m.
• Try to unify the existing proof methodologies for CBC-MAC and variants.
• Try to refine the model for the security proofs by distinguishing between known and
chosen texts and MAC verifications as is typically done in papers presenting attacks on
MAC schemes.
• CBC-MAC has the disadvantage that it does not allow for parallelism, unlike
PMAC [13]. For PMAC we might ask: Can the gap between proofs and bounds for
PMAC be closed easily? Can this construction be further simplified (see also Rogaway,
Asiacrypt 2004)?
• Can we develop better attacks and proofs for the security against key recovery attacks
for constructions that double the key length such as MacDES [31] and the ANSI retail
MAC?
24 ECRYPT — European NoE in Cryptology
• Can we beat the birthday bound? There are only two MAC constructions known that
beat the birthday bound: RMAC [25] (which needs a stronger security assumption on
the block cipher, i.e. that the block cipher needs to be resistant to related-key attacks)
and XOR-MAC [4]. Do other constructions exist that are more efficient than XOR-
MAC, yet require weaker assumptions than RMAC?
1.4.2 Hash function based MAC algorithms
The security of HMAC, EHMAC and ENMAC [42] is based on a set of non-standard assump-
tions, such as pseudo-randomness properties in the presence of secret initialization vectors
(IVs) and collision-resistance or weak-collision-resistance with secret IVs. These assumptions
should be studied for reduced-round versions of popular hash algorithms such as MD5, SHA-
1 and RIPEMD-160. Also, collisions and near-collisions have been found on several hash
functions recently.
• For how many rounds of these functions can one break the HMAC construction?
• Do near-collisions endanger the HMAC construction at all? Are more efficient primitives
such as EHMAC or ENMAC at risk?
1.4.3 Universal hash function based MAC algorithms
Universal hash functions known today are either moderately efficient (in between HMAC-
SHA-1 or HMAC-MD5) with a rather short key, or extremely efficient (UMAC [11]) with a
rather long key.
• Can we improve the trade-off, that is, develop constructions that are extremely fast in
software yet have modest keys (say less than 64 bytes)?
1.4.4 Authenticated encryption schemes
An authenticated encryption scheme is a symmetric-key mechanism in which both the privacy
and the authenticity of a message are protected. The standard admitted solution is a two-
pass scheme where one encrypts the data using a symmetric encryption algorithm and checks
the message for authenticity using a MAC algorithm. Both algorithms use their own key.
The generic composition paradigm is to encrypt-then-authenticate, but certain schemes may
also prove secure if composed the opposite way [32]. More efficient schemes such as one-
pass schemes do also exist. They provide simultaneous encryption and authentication and
include IAPM [28], OCB [45], XCBC [23], but they all make use of independent random
masking data. Other variants define schemes for which headers and specific data need not
be encrypted. These are called authenticated-encryption schemes with associated data. Still
other schemes exist which associate authenticity with encryption based on stream ciphers.
• Under which conditions are security proofs available for schemes which authenticate-
then-encrypt or encrypt-and-authenticate?
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• Are there any one-pass AE schemes which do not require independent random masking
data? Is there an alternative approach?
• Can we develop security proofs for recently proposed AE primitives based on stream
ciphers?
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2 Algebraic attacks on symmetric primitives
The recent development of algebraic attacks can be considered an important breakthrough in
the analysis of symmetric primitives, since they apply to both block and stream ciphers. The
basic principle of these techniques goes back to Shannon’s work: they consist in expressing the
whole cryptosystem as a large system of multivariate algebraic equations (typically over F2),
which can be solved to recover the secret key. Efficient algorithms for solving such algebraic
systems are therefore the essential ingredients of algebraic attacks and have recently started
receiving special attention from the cryptographic community.
In this section we discuss the basic principles of algebraic attacks on block and stream
ciphers. We give a brief overview of the construction of such attacks and the main algorithms
for solving algebraic systems. We conclude with recent results on the complexity of some of
these algorithms and future research directions.
2.1 Algebraic attacks
Algebraic attacks represent a new approach to cryptanalysis. In contrast to conventional
methods of cryptanalysis, these new techniques are primarily algebraic rather than statistical;
they exploit the intrinsic algebraic structure of the cipher. More specifically, the attacker
expresses the encryption transformation as a large set of multivariate polynomial equations,
and subsequently attempts to solve the system to recover the encryption key. Algebraic
attacks are in principle applicable to both block ciphers and stream ciphers.
Block ciphers. While in theory most modern block ciphers can be fully described by a
system of multivariate polynomials over a finite field, for the majority of the cases such
systems prove to be just too complex for any practical purpose. Yet there are a number of
recently proposed ciphers that present a highly algebraic structure and could therefore be more
vulnerable to algebraic attacks [4]. Of particular interest is the case of the AES. Courtois and
Pieprzyk described in [13] how to express the AES encryption operation as a large, sparse,
overdefined system of multivariate quadratic equations over F2. Based on an alternative
representation of the cipher, a simpler system of equations over F256 was presented in [21].
These two systems exploit the fact that the AES S-Box is based on the inverse mapping over
F256, and has therefore a very simple algebraic description. Although some ad hoc methods
have been proposed for solving these systems, currently it is not known whether they can
provide an efficient way to recover the secret key.
Stream ciphers. Generally speaking, algebraic attacks have been (in theory) quite effective
in the analysis of several LFSR-based stream ciphers [10]. The attack exploits the fact that
each new bit of the key stream gives a new equation on the key bits. By collecting a large
number of bits from the key stream, one can construct a system of equations that can be
solved using one of the methods discussed below.
30 ECRYPT — European NoE in Cryptology
2.2 Techniques for solving polynomial systems
Solving multivariate polynomial systems is a typical problem studied in Algebraic Geometry
and Commutative Algebra. In this section, we focus on the main algorithms for solving
algebraic systems, in the context of cryptology. Our discussion will go from the simplest to
the most efficient algorithms, that is from the linearization principle to F4 and F5, through XL
and Buchberger algorithms, although this does not respect the chronological order of discovery
of these algorithms. We conclude by discussing some recent results on the relationship between
these algorithms.
The problem. Let k be a field and f1, . . . , fm be polynomials in n variables with coefficients
in k, i.e. fi ∈ k[X1, . . . , Xn], for i = 1, . . . , m. Let K be an algebraic extension of k. The
problem is to find (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Kn such that fi(x1, . . . , xn) = 0, for i = 1, . . . , m. Note
that the problem may have no solution (inconsistency of the equations), a finite number of
solutions, or an infinite number of solutions (when the system is underdefined and K is the
algebraic closure of k).
This problem is most often studied in the context of abstract algebra. More precisely, let
I ⊆ k[X1, . . . , Xn] be the ideal generated by f1, . . . , fm and
VK(I) = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Kn; fi(x1, . . . , xn) = 0, for i = 1 . . . m}
be the variety over K associated to I. The problem is then to find VK(I).
When k is a finite field of order q, one can always add to the existing set of equations
the so-called field equations Xqi = Xi, for i = 1 . . . n, and obtain m + n equations. For most
cryptographic applications, the case of interest is when k = K = F2. In this case, the field
equations are X2i = Xi. This preprocessing step has the following consequences: the space of
solutions is 0-dimensional (or empty), including at “infinity”, and the ideal becomes radical
(i.e. the solutions are of multiplicity one). In the following discussion, we will consider that
the systems have been prepared this way, when q is not too large.
2.2.1 Linearization
The method of linearization is a well-known technique for solving large systems of multivariate
polynomial equations. In this method, one considers all monomials in the system as indepen-
dent variables and tries to solve the system using linear algebra techniques. More precisely,
let A be the set of multi-indices α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Nn, which represent the exponents of
the monomials of k[X1, . . . , Xn]. Then any polynomial f can be written as f =
∑
α∈A cαX
α,
where the sum involves only a finite number of monomials Xα = Xα11 · · ·Xαnn . Using this
notation, we can write the following matrix ML:



. . . Xα . . .
f1 . . . c
1
α . . .
...
fm . . . c
j
α . . .



= ML,
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where fi =
∑
α c
i
αX
α. Note that the columns of the matrix can be arranged in different ways,
depending on the order chosen to sort the multi-indices α.
To apply linearization, one now considers each (non-constant) monomial Xα as an inde-
terminate and attempts to solve the corresponding system of linear equations using linear
algebra techniques.
The effectiveness of the method clearly depends of the number of linearly independent
polynomials in the system. For example, in the case of boolean functions, the total number
of monomials of degree less than or equal to 2 (excluding the constant) is
(
n
2
)
+n. Thus if the
system consists of m polynomials of degree 2, it can be solved if the matrix ML has this rank.
Note that the method also tolerates a smaller rank: it is possible to perform an exhaustive
search on the affine space of solutions when the dimension of the kernel of the matrix is not
too large.
Concerning the complexity, we observe that the cost of the linear algebra operations is
O(N3), N being the size of the matrix ML. We may theoretically write O(N
ω), ω being the
exponent of linear algebra, and sometimes even optimistically use ω ≈ 2 + ε in the case of
sparse matrices.
Linearization has been considered in the cryptanalysis of LFSR-based, filtered, stream
ciphers. As stated before, each new bit of the key stream gives rise to a new equation on the
key bits, and by using a large number of bits from the key stream, one should have in theory
enough equations to directly apply linearization. Note however that no practical attack has
been reported to have been implemented using linearization, and the problem of estimating
the rank of the linearized system is still unsolved (even if experimental results on attacking
reduced versions of Toyocrypt point out that the number of linear dependencies is limited in
these cases).
2.2.2 The XL algorithm and variants
In order to apply the linearization method, the number of linearly independent equations in the
system needs to be approximately the same as the number of terms in the system. When this
is not the case, a number of techniques have been proposed that attempt to generate enough
LI equations. The most publicized is the XL algorithm (standing for eXtended Linearization),
which was introduced in [11]. The XL algorithm aims at introducing new rows to the matrix
ML, by multiplication of the original equations by monomials of prescribed degree. More
specifically, the following matrix MXL is constructed:








. . . Xα . . .
...
...
Xβf1 . . . c
1,β
α . . .
...
...
Xβ
′
fm . . . c
j,β′
α . . .
...
...








= MXL,
where the set of the rows is constructed from all products Xβfj =
∑
α c
j,β
α Xα, where β and
fj are such that deg(X
βfj) ≤ D, D being a parameter of the algorithm. The hope is that at
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least one univariate equation (say in X1) will appear after the Gaussian elimination on MXL.
This equation should be easily solved over the finite field, the found values substituted in the
equations, and the process repeated for the other indeterminates Xi, i ≥ 2. One expects that
after a few iterations, the algorithm will yield a solution for the system.
To estimate the complexity of the XL algorithm, the problem is to find D such that
XL succeeds with parameter D. Since the number of monomials of total degree ≤ D in
k[X1, . . . , Xn] is equal to
(
n+D
D
)
, there is an exponential dependance on D.
Since the introduction of the XL method, a number of variants have been proposed at-
tempting to exploit some specific properties of the polynomial system [12]. Of particular
relevance for the analysis of block ciphers is the XSL proposed in [13]. This method is based
on the XL algorithm, but uses the sparsity and specific structure of the equations; instead
of multiplying the equations by all monomials of degree ≤ D − 2 (supposing that the orig-
inal equations were quadratic), in the XSL algorithm the equations are multiplied only by
“carefully selected monomials” [13]. This has the intention to create less new terms when
generating the new equations.
Analysis of the XSL algorithm does not seem to be an easy task, and currently very little is
known about its behaviour. The reasons for that are the many versions of the algorithm found
in the literature, where the description of the method often leave some room for interpretation.
Furthermore, given the size of the systems involved, it is very difficult to implement and run
experiments even on small examples to verify the heuristics in [14, 13]. Recent results [7]
indicate however that, as presented in [13], the algorithm cannot solve the system arising
from the AES, and some doubts are cast on whether the algorithm in its current form can
provide an efficient method for solving the AES system of equations.
2.2.3 Gröbner bases algorithms
Gröbner bases algorithms are perhaps the best known technique for solving polynomial sys-
tems. These algorithms return a basis for the ideal derived from the set of equations, which
can then be used to obtain the solutions of the system. The most accessible historical refer-
ence is [6], while the book [15] presents a gentle introduction to the topic together with the
basics of algebraic geometry (it does not however included the more recent algorithms F4 and
F5).
We now give a definition of a Gröbner basis of an ideal. Let ¹ be a monomial order, i.e.
a total order on the set of monomials Xα, α ∈ Nn, which is compatible with multiplication.
Then the set of terms cαX
α of a polynomial f =
∑
α cαX
α ∈ k[X1, . . . , Xn] can be ordered
with respect to ¹, and the notion of leading term LT(f), leading monomial LM(f) and leading
coefficient LC(f) of the polynomial f are all well defined.
Let I ⊆ k[X1, . . . , Xn] be an ideal and LM(I) = {LM(f) ; f ∈ I} the set of leading
monomials of polynomials in I. A Gröbner basis of the ideal I is a set G = {g1, . . . , gl} ⊂ I
such that:
LM(I) =
l
⋃
i=1
LM(gi).{Xα, α ∈ Nn}.
In other words, G is a Gröbner basis of I if the leading term of any polynomial in I is divisible
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by the leading term of some polynomial of G. One can show that every non-empty ideal
I ⊆ k[X1, . . . , Xn] has a Gröbner basis (which however is not unique). It is to be stressed
that the notion of Gröbner basis is a mathematical one, independently of any algorithm
computing Gröbner bases.
There is also the notion of a Gröbner basis of degree D of an ideal I (denoted by GD),
which has the property that the leading monomial of every polynomial in I of degree ≤ D is
divisible by the leading monomial of a polynomial of GD. It can be shown that there exists
D large enough such that GD is a Gröbner basis of I.
Gröbner bases algorithms are powerful tools for solving systems of polynomial equations.
In most cases, when the Gröbner basis is found, the solution is also found. For most crypto-
graphic applications, we will have a system with unique solution, say (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Fn2 , and
the ideal is radical. Then the reduced Gröbner basis of I is {X1 − a1, . . . , Xn − an}.
The Buchberger algorithm
The Buchberger algorithm is the classical algorithm for computing the Gröbner basis of
an ideal I. It works based on a generalization of the Euclidean division of polynomials
in one variable to the multivariate case. More precisely, given a monomial order, there
exists an algorithm division(f, f1, . . . , fl) = (g1, . . . , gl, r) with the following properties:
f = f1g1 + . . . flgl + r, and no leading monomial of the gi divides r. Then a Gröbner basis
of an ideal generated by f1, . . . , fl can be computed by the following algorithm (Buchberger
algorithm):
Initialize: G = {f1, . . . , fl}
Loop
1. Combine every pair fi, fj by cancelling leading terms, to get S(fi, fj)
(the S-polynomials);
2. Compute the remainders of the S(fi, fj) by G;
3. Augment G with the non-zero remainders.
Until all remainders are zero.
Return G.
One can show that this algorithm terminates and computes a Gröbner basis of the ideal
generated by f1, . . . , fl. It is a fact that most S-polynomials generated in step 1 will reduce to
zero, and therefore many useless computations leading to zero remainder are performed. The
algorithm can be modified to include Buchberger’s criteria [5], which are a priori conditions
on the pairs (fi, fj) to detect the ones whose S-polynomial will have a remainder equal to
zero, and therefore discard them from steps 1, 2 of the algorithm. While a great proportion
of pairs will be discarded by the criteria, still many S-polynomials constructed will reduce to
zero, as experienced in reported implementations.
The complexity of the Buchberger algorithm is closely related to the total degree of the
intermediate polynomials that are generated during the running of algorithm. In the worst
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case, it is known to run in double exponential time. Regarding implementation, there are
number of optimizations that can be made to improve the performance of the algorithm. For
example, the main loop of the algorithm can be sliced into loops of finer grain, and instead of
combining every possible pair, pairs can be successively selected with respect to some strategy,
and steps 2 and 3 can be performed with this selection. For instance, the most recent pairs
from G can be chosen; alternatively, the pairs of smallest total degree may also be chosen.
The F4 and F5 algorithms
The F4 algorithm [17] can be roughly sketched as a matricial version of the Buchberger algo-
rithm. To introduce the idea, we first depict the Euclidean division for univariate polynomials
f = fdX
d + · · ·+f1X +f0 and g = gd′Xd
′
+ · · ·+g1X +g0, with d′ ≤ d, as a matrix reduction
algorithm. Consider the following:









Xd Xd−1 X0
f fd fd−1 . . . f0
Xd−d
′
g gd′ gd′−1 . . . g0
Xd−d
′−1g 0 gd′ gd′−1 . . . g0
Xd−d
′−2g 0 0 gd′ gd′−1 . . . g0
...
...
. . .
. . .
g 0 0 0 0 gd′ gd′−1 . . . g0









(1)
Then successive reductions of the first row by the remaining rows (row echelon reduction
by elementary row operations) give the remainder of f by g. Similarly the multivariate
division algorithm can be written in a matrix fashion.
At each iteration of the F4 algorithm, corresponding to each iteration in the Buchberger
algorithm, and subject to the selection strategy, the two parts fi and fj of the selected pairs
(f1, fj) are written in a global matrix MF4 . Now the crucial point of the algorithm F4 it to
write, at a given step of the algorithm, all the considered fi and fj into this global matrix,
together with all already known polynomials of the current basis G, multiplied by fitting
monomials, in the same way as the polynomial g is shifted in the matrix in (1).
Then, in a single step corresponding to one iteration in the Buchberger algorithm, a huge
matrix reduction operation (computation of the row echelon form) is done on the matrix MF4 .
In contrast to the Buchberger algorithm, where each remainder is computed separately and
sequentially, this global reduction operates all reductions of all polynomials by all multiples
of polynomials in the current basis G. It turns out that, properly implemented, this is a big
win [17, 23]. Additionally, the algorithm can also benefit from any optimization technique
from linear algebra algorithmics which can be applied here.
The F5 algorithm [18] is an optimized version of the F4 algorithm, with an optimal F5
criterion, generalizing Buchberger’s criteria, for discarding any pair which will reduce to zero
in the remaining computations. That is, the rank of the constructed matrix MF5 is equal to
the number of its rows (property of full rank).
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Relationship between these algorithms
Recent research has shown that some of the algorithms introduced above are related. In fact,
let M∞ denote the Macaulay matrix with an infinite number of rows and columns, defined as








. . . Xα . . .
...
...
Xβfi . . . c
1,β
α . . .
...
...
Xβ
′
fj . . . c
j,β′
α . . .
...
...








= M∞,
for all monomials Xβ , Xβ
′
, of unbound degree. The MXL matrix of the XL algorithm in
degree D is therefore just a finite submatrix of the Macaulay matrix, corresponding to all
monomials of degree less than or equal to D. Performing a Gaussian elimination on the
Macaulay matrix is equivalent to running the Buchberger algorithm [20]. This fact is closely
related to the behaviour of the XL algorithm, and it is shown in [1] that the XL algorithm
terminates for a degree D if and only if it terminates in degree D for the lexicographical
ordering.
Concerning F4, we can see that the matrix








. . . Xα . . .
...
...
Xβfi . . . c
1,β
α . . .
...
...
Xβ
′
fj . . . c
j,β′
α . . .
...
...








= MF4
is constructed only from pairs (fi, fj) originating from the previous iterations of the algorithm,
and which are not discarded by the Buchberger criteria. This shows that MF4 is a very small
submatrix of the matrix MXL constructed by XL. Using an XL description as an F4 algorithm,
it is proven [1] that a slightly modified XL computes a Gröbner basis.
We note that things are pushed further in the same vein, when one considers the F5
algorithm, which constructs a matrix MF5 with even less rows than MF4 . In [1], an example
is given for the case of 130 equations in 128 variables, where the number of rows in the matrix
MXL will be more than 10 thousands times the number of rows in the matrix MF5 .
2.3 Complexity bounds
We now state some results on the complexity of the algorithms introduced above, taken
from [16, 24], which focus on the XL algorithm, and from [3], which focus on F5. In both
cases, the concepts of Hilbert Theory are behind the scenes, and it is important to understand
it to properly analyze these algorithms. In the case of XL, the point is to find the degree
D such that an univariate equation in the last variable X1 can be found after the Gaussian
elimination process.
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For a “generic system” of quadratic polynomials, we have the following complexity result:
when the number of polynomials is m = n+ c, then the minimum degree for XL to succeed is
D ≥ n√
c − 1 + 1 .
Since the number of monomials is
(
n
D
)
in the boolean case, and
(
n+D
D
)
in the general case,
this theorem implies that XL has an exponential complexity.
For F5, the highest degree which appears in the algorithm is when the number of rows is
equal to the number of columns (because of the property of full rank). This reasoning is exact
since the F5 criterion eliminates all rows which reduce to zero. In [3], we are presented with
the following result for quadratic polynomials over F2: for n equations in n variables (without
counting the field equations), the degree for which F5 stops is approximately D ≈ 0.09n, the
approximation being valid even for small n. This also implies exponential complexity for F5.
For generic systems (over F2) the results are the following [3]: when m grows linearly
with n, the size of the matrix is exponential in n, and the complexity of F5 is exponential;
when n/m tends to zero, F5 is subexponential; and when m grows as Nn
2, F5 has polynomial
complexity, with exponent depending on N .
Application to cryptology
The results above indicate that, being of exponential nature, the algorithms introduced earlier
should be of very limited use in cryptology, given the large sizes involved. It is known however
that F5 was used successfully for solving the HFE challenge I [19]. In fact, this experiment
has also been reproduced with an independent implementation of F4 [23], and it now takes a
few hours to break HFE challenge I with affordable Magma software [22] on a workstation.
The reason is that the theorems above hold for generic systems, which are basically
systems with no particular properties. In the case on finite fields, random systems take the
role of generic systems. In mathematical terms, they are semi-regular sequences, which are
conjectured to be the “generic” case. It turns out however that the HFE systems of equations
are not random-like [9, 19], and it appears that F5 (and also F4 as reported in [23]) is sensitive
to this fact, i.e. it is a distinguisher for HFE systems. More precisely, the degree for which
the matrix MF5 has large enough rank is much lower than the generic bound. From the
implementation of XL made in [1], it seems that the XL algorithm is not sensitive to this
fact.
For the case of block ciphers, although no practical attack has ever been reported, it
appears they also give rise to very structured systems. Table 1 is an extension (from [2]) of
the table given in [4], where systems of quadratic equations have been constructed for various
ciphers; in this case the expected degree reached by the F5 algorithm and the size of the
matrices have been added. We can see that the expected degrees are quite large and that the
matrices should be in principle too large to be tractable.
One should bear in mind however that the sizes given in Table 1 are the ones that would
be reached if these systems were generic. It may be well that the systems are non generic, in
which case F5 may succeed with a lower D and smaller matrices. With the current state of
knowledge, only practical experiments could tell how these systems behave.
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Cipher Variables Linear equations Quadratic equations D Matrix size
Khazad 6464 1664 6000 379 22076
Misty1 3856 2008 1848 179 21040
Kasumi 4264 2264 2000 193 21129
Camelia-128 3584 1920 4304 78 2538
Rijndael-128 3296 1696 4600 69 2479
Serpent-128 16640 8320 9360 703 24196
Table 1: The degree D for the systems of equations constructed in [4]
2.4 Research Directions
Algebraic attacks have received a lot of attention of the cryptographic community in the last
few years. Although they have been considered against the HFE cryptosystem as well as
a number of LFSR-based stream ciphers, there has not been too much progress in assessing
whether they can be effective against block ciphers. The main reason is that the size of systems
arising from block ciphers are completely out of reach for the current computational power.
While for most methods of cryptanalysis it is quite straightforward to perform experiments
on reduced versions of the cipher to understand how the attack might perform, this has not
been the case for algebraic attacks on block ciphers. One possible direction to follow is the
introduction of toy examples of symmetric ciphers, in order to test the effectiveness of the
main algorithms in solving the systems of algebraic equations. However it is not an easy task
to design small versions that can replicate the main cryptographic and algebraic properties
of the cipher. Currently there is some work being performed on small scale variants of the
AES [8], and the hope is that this can provide a preliminary insight into the behaviour of
algebraic cryptanalysis on the AES.
Additionally, there is much that can be done on the algorithmic side as well. Computer
algebra is a well established subject, and some of the algorithms presented earlier have been
known and extensively studied for a number of years now. For example, Gröbner bases
algorithms are known to be a powerful tool for solving systems of polynomial equations. They
are however general-purpose algorithms, which are used to deal with a number of problems
arising in algebraic geometry (including computing the solutions of a system). They may well
prove to be an overkill when considered in the context of cryptography. The systems arising
from symmetric ciphers are very structured and with special characteristics: they are usually
sparse, with unique solution over a finite field, structured in blocks of similar format (rounds),
etc. Perhaps the most promising approach would be the development of dedicated methods for
specific block ciphers. These could be built upon known techniques from computer algebra,
but aiming to exploit the special properties of a particular system. This theoretical approach
together with experiments with small versions of the ciphers can hopefully shed some light
on how effective algebraic attacks can be against symmetric ciphers.
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3 Design of Symmetric primitives
Many attacks on conventional cryptographic algorithms are related to some properties of the
Boolean functions describing the system. The formalization of well-known attacks such as
linear or differential cryptanalysis on block ciphers, correlation attacks against LFSR-based
stream ciphers. . . have led to the definitions of some relevant quantities related to Boolean
functions. These quantities measure the resistance of a cryptosystem to classical attacks.
For instance, it has been proved that the use of highly nonlinear substitution functions in a
block cipher guarantees a high resistance to linear cryptanalysis. The resistance to differential
attacks can also be quantified by some properties of the substitution function. For stream
ciphers, it is well-known that the use of a correlation-immune Boolean function in combin-
ing generators avoids correlation attacks. The designers of symmetric ciphers now provide
evidence that their ciphers cannot be broken by these classical attacks.
However, many problems remain open and there is no exact recipe for choosing the com-
posing functions of a symmetric algorithm. The first reason is that the well-known criteria on
Boolean functions are obviously necessary but not sufficient security conditions. Some new
cryptanalytic techniques have recently been proposed. They have introduced new require-
ments which must be investigated. The major recent breakthrough in this area is certainly
the development of algebraic attacks against both block and stream ciphers. It has led to the
definition of a new criterion, called algebraic immunity. Many issues related to this new pa-
rameter must be studied. For instance, there is a need for a fast algorithm which determines
the algebraic immunity of a function with many variables. It is also necessary to determine
the relationships between algebraic immunity and the other criteria; at the moment, it re-
mains unclear whether some previously known criteria are compliant with a high algebraic
immunity. Another major problem is to find some general constructions for functions which
guarantee both a high algebraic immunity and a low implementation complexity.
Besides these new criteria, there is still a need for constructions of functions which provide
an optimal resistance to classical attacks. Even the optimal values for some classical quan-
tities, such as the nonlinearity, are still unknown. Moreover, there are often some trade-offs
between all criteria, and it is very important to determine which of them are really relevant
in a particular context, and then to give some general constructions dedicated to a given
application. Suitable constructions of Boolean functions and S-boxes must also include some
implementation constraints.
Finally, optimizing the resistance to some classical attacks usually leads to the choice of
functions which possess very particular structures. For instance, most known S-boxes which
satisfy maximal resistance to both differential and linear attacks are linearly equivalent to
some power functions over a finite field. The intuition is that such a strong algebraic property
may introduce a weakness which could be exploited by another attack. Many other specific
structural properties appear in the study of optimal objects. But, it is not clear if these
properties are really relevant since no associated attack has been found so far. It is then
essential to try investigate these structural properties from a cryptanalytic point of view and
to determine whether they induce a weakness or not.
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3.1 Boolean functions for stream ciphers
LFSR-based stream ciphers are very popular because LFSRs are appropriate for low-cost
hardware implementations, produce sequences with good statistical properties and can be
easily analyzed. For the two most well-known families, combining generators and filter gener-
ators, the security relies primarily on the Boolean function used either for combining several
LFSRs or for filtering the state of a single register. In such systems, the Boolean function is
actually the only component which breaks the linearity inherent to the LFSRs. In practical
applications, some additional techniques are usually used in order to make attacks on these
ciphers more difficult. The most commonly used method consists in clocking the involved
LFSRs in an irregular way, as in A5/1, . . . . But, the weaknesses of the regularly clocked
system may nevertheless be exploited for the irregularly clocked generator. For instance, a
distinguisher for the simple underlying generator can be used in a divide-and-conquer attack
which performs an exhaustive search on the clocking subsystem only. For these reasons, it
is often recommended that even more complex LFSR-based ciphers follow the basic design
criteria required for the simple underlying generator.
3.1.1 Filtering functions
In a filter generator, it is well-known that the inherent Boolean function must satisfy the
following three properties. It must be balanced, i.e., its output must be uniformly distributed.
It must possess a high algebraic degree in order to guarantee a high linear complexity. Its
correlation-immunity order must be at least equal to 1, depending on the choice of the tapping
sequence. The function must have a high nonlinearity, i.e., it must lie as far as possible from
all functions of degree 1. Otherwise the existence of a good affine approximation can be
exploited in a fast correlation attack. In this case, the keystream is seen as a noisy version of
the output of an LFSR with known feedback polynomial, and the initial state of the register
can be recovered by applying some decoding algorithms. When an n-variable filtering function
is used, the error-probability that the attacker has to correct corresponds to the nonlinearity
of the function divided by 2n.
Constructing filtering functions which satisfy the previous three criteria is not a completely
solved problem, even though it has been investigated for several years. Actually, the highest
possible nonlinearity for a balanced Boolean function of n variables is still unknown for n ≥ 8.
There are two major results in this field: the first one is a general recursive construction due
to Dobbertin [36] which consists in modifying a normal bent function in order to obtain a
balanced and highly nonlinear function. By definition, a normal bent function f of n variables
is constant on an affine subspace V and balanced on all other cosets of V . Therefore, replacing
the restriction of f to V by a highly nonlinear function g of n/2 variables leads to a balanced
function with nonlinearity 2n−1 − 2n/2 + NL(g). This construction can be iterated if n/2 is
even, and it provides a lower bound on the best achievable nonlinearity for a balanced function.
It is worth noticing that bent functions are essential ingredients in this construction. It is
therefore necessary to go further in the study and in the construction of bent functions (even if
they may have no direct cryptographic applications because they are not balanced) if we want
to find many highly nonlinear balanced functions with good cryptographic properties. For
instance, the simple Maiorana-McFarland family of bent functions provide many functions,
but they seem to be inherently vulnerable to algebraic attacks. A more specific construction
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of highly nonlinear balanced functions of n variables has been proposed in [72] for some
values of n. These functions have been obtained by computer from the well-known Paterson-
Wiedemann’s functions. The proposed algorithm leads to balanced functions of n = (15 +
2k) variables having nonlinearity strictly greater than 2n−1 − 2n−12 (which is the highest
nonlinearity achievable by quadratic functions).
The design of good filtering then presents both theoretical aspects (such as the determina-
tion of the best achievable nonlinearity for a balanced function) and practical issues. Actually,
a function of more than 15 variables can be used in practice only if it can be represented in
a compact form (e.g. with a sparse algebraic normal form). Therefore, it seems very impor-
tant to focus on the cryptographic properties of Boolean functions which can be implemented
with a few gates. Symmetric functions (i.e., Boolean functions whose output only depends
on the Hamming weight of the input) are good candidates in terms of implementation com-
plexity because they are the only functions having a known implementation with a number
of gates which is linear in the number of input variables [79]. But, they have generally bad
cryptographic properties as shown in [18]. Some generalizations such as rotation symmetric
functions [42, 77] seem to be better from a cryptographic point of view, but further work
needs to be done in this direction, including both cryptographic and implementation aspects.
3.1.2 Combining functions
When a Boolean function is used for combining the outputs of several LFSRs, it must ob-
viously be balanced and have a high algebraic degree for the same reasons as for a filtering
function. Two particular requirements are specific to the case of combining functions. They
must have a high order of correlation-immunity (also called order of resiliency when the func-
tion is balanced). The correlation-immunity order is the highest number t such that the
output of the function remains balanced when any t input variables are fixed. The cryp-
tographic significance of this parameter is as follows: for a t-th order correlation-immune
function, (t + 1) is the minimal number of LFSRs that must be considered together in a
correlation attack. In other words, a classical correlation attack (as defined by Siegenthaler)
requires an exhaustive search for the initial states of at least (t + 1) LFSRs. The second
important requirement for the combining function relates to the Hamming distance between
the combining function and the affine functions of (t + 1) variables. Indeed, in a (fast) cor-
relation attack, the attacker exploits the existence of a correlation between the running-key
and the output of a smaller combination generator, comprising k of the LFSRs combined by a
Boolean function g of k variables. If the combining function is t-th order correlation-immune,
the minimal value for k is (t+1) and the highest correlation is obtained when g is the (t+1)-
variable function closest to the combining function in terms of Hamming distance. Then, it
can be proved [16, 80] that the (t + 1)-variable function g which maximizes the correlation is
an affine function. The error-probability that the attacker has to correct in a fast correlation
then corresponds to the lowest Hamming distance between the n-variable combining function
and the affine functions depending on exactly t input variables. For this reason, the nonlin-
earity of the combining function provides an upper bound on the error-probability: the use
of a highly nonlinear combining function prevents fast correlation attacks. But, this is not a
necessary condition since the combining function must only be far from all affine functions
depending on few variables, and not from all affine functions.
44 ECRYPT — European NoE in Cryptology
One of the main problems in designing good combining functions is that there exist some
trade-offs between the previously mentioned criteria. Most notably, the degree of a balanced
and t-th order correlation-immune function of n variables is at most (n−t−1). Its nonlinearity
and its distance to affine functions of (t+1) variables is also upper-bounded because the Walsh
coefficients of a t-th order correlation-immune and balanced function are divisible by 2t+2 [73].
The divisibility is even higher when the degree of the function is not maximal, i.e., when it is
strictly less than (n − t − 1) [19, 21]. Some constructions of balanced t-th order correlation-
immune functions of n variables have been proposed (e.g. [73, 78, 61, 74, 70]. . . ), but only for
particular values of n and t. Only a few practical constructions are available to the designers
of combination generators. As noted in [74], the construction of optimal correlation-immune
and balanced functions of 8, 9 and 10 variables is still open. Moreover, it seems that most
proposed constructions are weak regarding algebraic attacks. For instance, the 3-resilient
function of 10 variables presented in [73] has been used as a filtering function in LILI-128,
but it does not guarantee an optimal resistance to algebraic attacks because of the existence
of many relations of degree 4 between its output and its inputs.
3.1.3 Algebraic immunity of Boolean functions
As pointed out by Courtois and Meier [28], all LFSR-based stream ciphers are vulnerable to
algebraic attacks if there exist relations of low degree between the output and the inputs of
the associated Boolean function f . Such relations correspond to low degree multiples of f ,
i.e., to relations g(x)f(x) = h(x) for some g where h has a low degree. But it was proved
in [41, 62] that, in the case of algebraic attacks over F2, the existence of any such relation is
equivalent to the existence of a low degree function in the annihilator ideal of f or of (1 + f).
Indeed, if g(x)f(x) = h(x) with deg(h) ≤ d, we obtain, by multiplying this equation by f(x),
that
g(x) [f(x)]2 = h(x)f(x) = g(x)f(x) = h(x) ,
leading to h(x) [1 + f(x)] = 0.
Suppose that the keystream bit at time t, st, is obtained by applying f to the current
internal state of the generator, st = f(xt). Then, the algebraic attack exploits the following
relations:
• if st = 1, any function g of degree at most d in the annihilator ideal of f , AN(f) =
{g | g(x)f(x) = 0, ∀x} leads to g(xt) = 0;
• if st = 0, any function g′ of degree at most d in AN(1 + f) leads to g′(xt) = 0.
If the transition function xt 7→ xt+1 is linear, the internal state of the generator at time t is a
linear function of the initial state: xt = Lt(x0). The previous relations then provide a system
of equations of degree d depending on ℓ variables where ℓ is the number of bits of initial state.
This system can be solved with one of the general techniques discussed in Section 2. The
simplest one, called linearization, consists in identifying the system with a linear system of
∑d
i=1
(
n
i
)
variables, where each product of i bits of the initial state (1 ≤ i ≤ d) is seen as a
new variable. The entire initial state is then recovered by a Gaussian reduction (or by more
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sophisticated techniques) whose time complexity is roughly
(
d
∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
)ω
≃ ℓωd ,
where ω is the exponent of the matrix inversion algorithm, i.e., ω ≃ 2.37 [25]. This rough
estimate for the time complexity will be used later for computing the suitable parameters
for the Boolean functions used in LFSR-based stream ciphers. But, it should be noted that
algebraic attacks have usually been applied against filter generators, and that it is not clear
whether the complexity may not be lower for combining generators because of the particular
structure of the algebraic system (the internal state of LFSR i at time t only depends on the
initial state of this LFSR and not on all bits of the initial states).
The cryptographic relevance of the algebraic immunity. The relevant parameter in
the context of algebraic attack, called the algebraic immunity of the Boolean function, AI(f),
is the lowest degree achieved by a function in AN(f) ∪ AN(1 + f). A simple combinatorial
argument implies that, for any Boolean function f of n variables, AI(f) ≤ ⌈n/2⌉. We deduce
from this bound that if an n-variable function is used in the generator, the complexity of
the algebraic attack will be at most ℓ
ωn
2 , where ℓ is the size of the internal state. This value
must be higher than the complexity of an exhaustive search for the key. We here suppose
that the size of the internal state is minimal with respect to key-size k, i.e. that ℓ = 2k (it is
known that the size of the internal state must be at least twice the key size in order to resist
time-memory trade-off attacks). Therefore, we must have (2k)
ωn
2 ≥ 2k, i.e.,
n ≥ 0.84
[
k
1 + log2(k)
]
.
For instance, a filter generator with a 128-bit key and a 256-bit LFSR must use a filtering
function of at least 16 variables. Note that the recommended number of variables is probably
higher than the previous bound because more efficient techniques can be used for solving the
algebraic system (see Section 2).
Properties of the annihilator ideal of a Boolean function. The set AN(f) of all
annihilating functions of f is obviously an ideal in the ring of all Boolean functions, and it
is generated by (1 + f). It consists of the 22
n−wt(f) functions of n variables which vanish
on the support of f , i.e., on all x such that f(x) = 1, where wt(f) denotes the size of the
support of f . It is important to note that the number of functions with a given degree in
AN(f) ∪ AN(1 + f) is less important from a cryptanalytic point of view than the algebraic
immunity: the number of such annihilating functions only influences the number of keystream
bits required for the attack, and not the time-complexity (except maybe for some refinements
such as fast algebraic attacks).
The number of functions of degree at most d in AN(f) is equal to 2κ where κ is the
dimension of the kernel of the matrix obtained by restricting the Reed-Muller code of length 2n
and order d to the support of f . In other words, the rows of this matrix correspond to the
evaluations of the monomials of degree at most d on {x, f(x) = 1}. Since this matrix has
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∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
rows and wt(f) columns, its kernel is non-trivial when
d
∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
> wt(f) .
Similarly, AN(1 + f) contains some functions of degree d or less if
d
∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
> 2n − wt(f) .
This shows, as pointed out in [33], that the algebraic immunity of an n-variable function is
related to its Hamming weight. Most notably, for odd n, only balanced functions can have
optimal algebraic immunity. For even n, the Hamming weight of a function with optimal
algebraic immunity must satisfy
n
2
−1
∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
≤ wt(f) ≤
n
2
∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
Algebraic immunity of 5-variable balanced functions. For 5-variable functions, it is
possible to compute the algebraic immunity of all Boolean functions using the classification
due to Berlekamp and Welch (because algebraic immunity is invariant under composition by
a linear permutation). We here focus on balanced functions because they are the only ones
that may have optimal algebraic immunity for n odd. First, we can compute the algebraic
immunity of all 601, 080, 390 balanced functions of 5 variables:
AI(f) 1 2 3
nb. of balanced f 62 403,315,208 197,765,120
proportion of balanced f 10−7 0.671 0.329
Another interesting quantity is the number of linearly independent annihilators of degree at
most 2 for all balanced functions of 5 variables:
dim(AN2(f)) 0 1 2 3 4 5
proportion of balanced f 0.329 0.574 0.094 0.002 2 · 10−5 10−7
An important observation is that both sets AN2(f) and AN2(1+f) have the same dimension
for all balanced functions except for one function and its complement (up to linear equiva-
lence). This raises the following open problem: for balanced Boolean functions f , is there
a general relationship between AN(f) and AN(1 + f)? A first relationship between the an-
nihilators of f and of 1 + f has been exhibited in [11] for functions with optimal algebraic
immunity depending on an odd number of variables: an n-variable Boolean function f , with n
odd, has optimal algebraic immunity n+12 if and only if AN(f) does not contain any nonzero
function of degree strictly less than n+12 .
Similar simulations can be performed as far as the functions of n variables are classified
into equivalence classes under composition by a linear permutation (see e.g. [7]). But, such a
classification only exist for n = 6 and for cubic functions up to 8 variables.
D.STVL.4 — Ongoing Research Areas in Symmetric Cryptography 47
Algebraic immunity of random balanced functions. Even if some well-known con-
structions of cryptographic Boolean functions have been proved to have a low algebraic im-
munity, probabilistic arguments tend to show that the proportion of balanced functions with
low algebraic immunity is very small. It has been proved in [62] that the probability that a
balanced function of n variables has algebraic immunity less than 0.22n tends to zero when n
tends to infinity. An upper bound on the probability that a balanced function has an annihi-
lator of degree less than d is also given. This bound involves a part of the weight enumerator
of RM(d, n) and any new information on its complete weight distribution can clearly improve
the result. However, this bound does not say anything on the average value of the algebraic
immunity or on the proportion of balanced functions with optimal algebraic immunity.
The proportion of balanced functions with optimal algebraic immunity obviously corre-
sponds to the probability that a subset of 2n−1 columns of the Reed-Muller code of length 2n
and of order ⌈n/2⌉ has maximal rank. If we assumed that the generator matrices of the
Reed-Muller codes behave like random matrices, we would deduce that the probability that
a balanced function has optimal algebraic immunity is (almost) constant. More precisely,
it would be deduced for n even, that the probability that AN(f) has minimal degree n/2
is almost 1 and, for n odd, that the probability that AN(f) has minimal degree n+12 (resp.
n−1
2 ) is 0.289 (resp. 0.711). One can first observe a difference with the results obtained for
n = 5, which is not very surprising because RM(2, 5) does not behave like a random code (its
weight distribution is clearly not close to the distribution expected for a random code with
similar parameters).
3.1.4 Algebraic immunity and other cryptographic criteria
Besides the Hamming weight of the function, its nonlinearity is also related to its algebraic
immunity [33]. It can be proved that, for any linear function ϕ, the algebraic immunity of
f +ϕ is at most AI(f)+ 1. Therefore, any function f of n variables with algebraic immunity
at least d satisfies
NL(f) ≥
d−2
∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
.
It follows that any function with optimal algebraic immunity has a high nonlinearity, more
precisely
NL(f) ≥
{
2n−1 −
(
n
n−1
2
)
if n is odd
2n−1 − 12
(
n
n
2
)
−
(
n
n
2
−1
)
if n is even
A high nonlinearity and a high algebraic immunity are then compatible criteria. Another
important consequence is that the nonlinearity of a function may be sufficient criteria to
decide whether it has low algebraic immunity (but the converse is not true).
Another cryptographic property that implies that a function does not have a maximal
algebraic immunity is the notion of normality. A function is said to be k-normal (resp. k-
weakly normal) if there exists an affine subspace of dimension k on which the function is
constant (resp. affine). Since the minimum weight codewords of RM(r, n) are those whose
support is an affine subspace of dimension n − r, we deduce that any k-normal function f of
n variables has algebraic immunity at most n−k. Similarly, any k-weakly normal function has
algebraic immunity at most n − k + 1. Non-normal (and non-weakly normal) functions such
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as the functions exhibited in [15] may be good candidates if we want to construct functions
with optimal nonlinearity.
The existence of links between algebraic immunity and other cryptographic criteria re-
mains unknown. For instance, the relation between the distance of a function to all low-degree
functions (i.e., its distance to R(d, n)) and its algebraic immunity is still unclear. Correlation-
immunity does not seem to be a priori incompatible with optimal algebraic immunity: there
exists a 1-resilient function of 5 variables with optimal algebraic immunity. However, the link
with all known criteria must be investigated further.
Algebraic immunity of known constructions. A few classes of Boolean functions with
optimal algebraic immunity have been recently exhibited. An iterative construction which
provides an infinite family of balanced Boolean functions with optimal algebraic immunity
is presented in [34]. However, this construction is quite complicated and it seems of little
practical use because of its implementation complexity. Another example of functions with
optimal algebraic immunity is the majority function, i.e., the function which outputs 1 if
and only if the Hamming weight of its input vector is greater than or equal to ⌈n2 ⌉. This
property was proved in [52, Theorem 1] in terms of information sets for the self-dual Reed-
Muller code, and it is also mentioned in [35, 8]. Since it is symmetric, this function has a very
low implementation complexity, but it presents many drawbacks regarding the other classical
cryptographic criteria.
The algebraic immunity of some classical constructions has also been investigated, for
instance, for the Maiorana-McFarland family, which consists of n-variable functions f derived
by concatenating 2n−k affine functions of k variables. This construction is quite popular
because it may lead to resilient functions and to highly nonlinear functions. It is proved
in [62, 69] that any function in AN(f) corresponds to the concatenation of annihilators of its
restrictions. Therefore, the algebraic immunity of f cannot exceed (n − k + 1).
More generally, the algebraic immunity of a function can be derived from the algebraic
immunities of its restrictions to a given hyperplane and to its complement [33]. For instance,
if
f(x1, . . . , xn) = (1 + xn)f1(x1, . . . , xn−1) + xnf2(x1, . . . , xn−1) ,
we have:
• if AI(f1) 6= AI(f2), then AI(f) = min(AI(f1), AI(f2)) + 1;
• if AI(f1) = AI(f2), then AI(f) ∈ {AI(f1), AI(f1) + 1}.
Therefore, it is obvious how to construct a function of 2t variables with optimal algebraic
immunity from two functions of (2t− 1) variables with respective algebraic immunities equal
to t and to (t − 1). But, constructing a function of (2t + 1) variables with optimal algebraic
immunity from two functions of 2t variables is much more difficult since both restrictions
must have optimal algebraic immunity and they must also satisfy some additional conditions.
The definition of an infinite family of Boolean functions with optimal algebraic immunity,
with other good cryptographic properties (such as high nonlinearity) and with a low gate
count is still an open problem and must be investigated.
D.STVL.4 — Ongoing Research Areas in Symmetric Cryptography 49
Computing the algebraic immunity of a Boolean function. The basic algorithm for
computing the algebraic immunity of an n-variable function consists in performing a Gaussian
elimination on the generator matrix of the punctured RM(⌊n−12 ⌋, n) restricted to the support
of f . This matrix has k(⌊n−12 ⌋, n) =
∑⌊n−1
2
⌋
i=0
(
n
i
)
rows and wt(f) columns. Therefore, the
algorithm requires k2(⌊n−12 ⌋, n)wt(f) operations, which is close to 23n−3 when f is balanced.
As noted in [62], the complexity can be significantly reduced if we only want to check whether
a function has annihilators of small degree d, since we do not need to consider all positions in
the support of f . Indeed, considering a number of columns which is only slightly higher that
the code dimension k(d, n) is usually sufficient for proving that a function does not admit any
annihilator of degree d.
A technique for reducing the size of the matrix over which the Gaussian elimination
is performed is presented in [62]. The idea is that the elements in the support of f with
low Hamming weight provide simple equations that can be removed from the matrix by a
substitution step. However, due to the lack of simulation results, it is very hard to evaluate
the time complexity of the substitution step in practice.
Gröbner bases algorithms such as F5 provide other techniques for computing the size
of the annihilator ideal. But they need to be compared with the basic techniques in this
particular context.
3.1.5 Resistance to fast algebraic attacks and other criteria
At CRYPTO 2003, Courtois presented some important improvements on algebraic attacks,
called fast algebraic attacks [26]. The refinement first relies on the existence of some low
degree relations between the bits of the initial state and not only one but several consecutive
keystream bits. In other word, the attacker wants to find some low degree relations g between
the inputs and outputs of the function
Fm: F
ℓ
2 → Fm2
x 7→ ((f(x), f(L(x)), . . . , f(Lm−1(x))
where L is the linear transition function for the internal state. This function is very similar
to the so-called augmented function defined in [1]. The fact that the augmented function
may be much weaker than the filtering function, i.e, than F0 with the previous notation,
has been pointed out by Anderson [1] in the context of (fast) correlation attacks. However,
the complexity required for computing the low degree relations between the n inputs and
m outputs of Fm increases with m. The direct algorithm (used for multi-output functions
and described in Section 3.2.3) can only be used for small m. It is an open problem to
determine whether there exist relationships between the algebraic immunity of f and the
algebraic immunity of Fm. The same problem arises for other cryptographic criteria such as
correlation immunity.
Since the computation of low degree relations involving several keystream bits is usually
infeasible, Courtois proposed to focus on particular subclasses of relations that can be obtained
much faster. The relations considered in the attack are given by linear combinations of
relations of the form
g(x0, . . . , xℓ−1, st, . . . , st+m−1)
50 ECRYPT — European NoE in Cryptology
where the terms of highest degree do not involve any keystream bits. Then, an additional
precomputation step consists in determining the linear combinations of the previous relations
which cancel out the highest degree monomials. Some algorithms for this step have been
proposed in [26, 2]. This technique helps to decrease the degree of the relations used in the
attack for different practical examples. But, here again, there is a lack of theoretical results
on the existence of such low degree linear combinations.
Criteria related to other attacks. Some other design criteria for filtering and combining
functions have appeared with the presentation of new attacks. A well-defined criterion is the
homorphorphicity of a filtering function. This quantity was defined by Zhang and Zheng [82]
for S-boxes but it was not directly related to a known attack. Recently, it has been shown
to measure the resistance to distinguishing attacks against filter generators [56, 64]. Indeed,
the keystream produced by a filter generator can be distinguished from a random sequence
by using the following fact: if we consider w internal state of the LFSR that sum up to zero
(these states correspond to multiples with w terms of the feedback polynomial), then the
probability that the corresponding keystream bits sum up to zero is strictly greater than 0.5.
The success of such a distinguisher is quantified by the w-th order homorphorphicity of the
filtering function, which is defined as the probability that f(x1) + · · · + f(xw) = 0 when
x1 + · · ·+ xw = 0. As shown in [56, 64], this probability can be derived from the sum of w-th
powers of the Walsh coefficients of the function. For w = 4, which is the optimal value for
the attack presented in [64], this quantity is known to be highly related to the sum-of-square
indicator and to the nonlinearity of the function [13].
Some other attacks have been proposed on the basic families of LFSR-based generators,
but the related resistance criteria still need to be formalized. As an example, the generalized
inversion attack [46] clearly involves the properties of some derivatives of the filtering func-
tion, but it is not clear whether the complexity of the attack is related to the propagation
characteristics of the filtering function.
As mentioned previously, a last class of attacks for which the related security criteria still
need to be determined is the class of attacks against filter generators related to the augmented
function, such as conditional correlation attacks [57] or fast algebraic attacks.
Intuitive criteria. The designers of filter generators or of combination generators usually
consider some additional requirements when they choose a Boolean function, since they want
to avoid some particular structures. These requirements sometimes correspond to suitable
cryptographic properties, but in another context. For instance, the propagation criterion is
obviously a suitable criterion for block ciphers or for hash functions, but it is not imposed by
any known attack on stream ciphers. Another example is the lack of linear structure. The
existence of linear structures is known to be a weakness for block ciphers. It is not the case
for combination generators and for filtering functions, but no concrete design makes use of
such a function. Note that it is even recommended in [45] that a filtering function has some
linear structure since this guarantees good statistical properties.
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3.1.6 More sophisticated functions in LFSR-based ciphers
Many stream ciphers do not use a simple Boolean filtering or combining function; they prefer
more sophisticated mappings in order to render the attacks more difficult or in order to
increase the throughput of the generator.
Multi-output Boolean functions. A basic technique for increasing the speed of the gen-
erator, especially for software dedicated ciphers, consists in using a function with several
outputs. Such functions are called vectorial Boolean functions, or S(ubstitution)-boxes by
analogy with block ciphers. But, as pointed out in [81], the resistance of the generator to fast
correlation attacks usually decreases with the number of output bits of the function. For a
single output function, the attack exploits the fact that the output may be approximated by
an affine function of the input variables. But, for a function S with m outputs, the attacker
can apply any Boolean function g of m variables to the output vector (y1, . . . , ym) and he or
she can perform the attack on the resulting sequence z = g(y1, . . . , ym). Therefore, the rele-
vant parameter is not the nonlinearity of the vectorial function, which is the lowest Hamming
distance between any linear combination of the components of S and the affine functions, but
the so-called unrestricted nonlinearity [20], which is the lowest distance between any function
g ◦ S and the affine functions, where g varies in the set of all nonzero Boolean functions of
m variables. It is shown in [81] that the function g which satisfies the lowest distance to
a given affine function can be deduced from the Walsh coefficients of S. Some lower and
upper bounds on the unrestricted nonlinearity of a functions are given in [81, 20]. A family
of balanced functions of 2t variables with t outputs having a high unrestricted nonlinearity is
also exhibited.
For similar reasons, the algebraic immunity of a vectorial function tends to decrease with
the number of output bits (see Section 3.2.3).
A particular case of generators based on multi-output Boolean functions are the word-
oriented ciphers. In order to increase the performance of software implementations, many
ciphers use LFSRs over an extension field F2m and the associated filtering function is usually
a mapping from Fn2m into F2m . This technique is used for instance in many stream ciphers
submitted to eSTREAM. The associated filtering function can obviously be seen as a vectorial
Boolean function with mn inputs and m outputs. Consequently, all results previously men-
tioned apply, but the major open issue here is to determine whether word-oriented attacks
can be mounted which exploit the particular structure of the function defined as a polynomial
over F2m .
It is important to note that the augmented function associated to a single output function
is also a particular vectorial function, with linearly equivalent components.
Functions with memory. In some LFSR-based generators, the combining or filtering
function is replaced by a finite automaton with some memory bits. An example is the E0
keystream generator used in the Bluetooth wireless LAN system, which uses a combining
function with 4 inputs and 4 memory bits. However, (fast) correlation attacks [60, 59, 58]
and (fast) algebraic attacks [4] can still be applied on such systems. Concerning algebraic
attacks, Armknecht and Krause proved that, for any filtering function of n variables with
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M memory bits, there always exists a relation of degree at most ⌈n(M+1)2 ⌉ between (M + 1)
consecutive output bits and the bits of the initial state, for a given initial assignment of the
memory bits. Obviously, relations of lower degree may exist. For instance, the function used
in E0 provides a relation of degree 4 involving 4 consecutive output bits, which leads to an
algebraic attack of running-time around 267 [4]. A similar situation occurs for multi-output
functions with memory [30].
The main open issue related to the use of such sophisticated functions is to improve
the efficiency of the algorithms for computing their cryptographic properties (unrestricted
nonlinearity, algebraic immunity, . . . ), for a large number of input variables. Another related
open problem is to find some general constructions which guarantee a high resistance to all
these attacks.
3.1.7 Filtering functions for stream ciphers with a nonlinear transition function
The development of algebraic attacks tends to recommend to replace LFSRs by other devices
based on a nonlinear transition function.The two main proposals in this direction are based
on FCSR [53, 5] and on T-functions [54, 55]. In these generators, the keystream is still
obtained by filtering the successive internal states by a (vectorial) Boolean function. But,
the requirements on the filtering function may differ very much from the criteria used for
LFSR-based ciphers. For instance, it does not seem necessary to use a function with a high
algebraic degree or with a high algebraic immunity in that context since the internal state
does not depend linearly on the initial state.
However, choosing a very simple function (such as a linear function) may be dangerous.
For instance, it was proposed in [55] to output at time t the n/2 most significant bits of the
n-bit state obtained by iteratively applying a T-function. The fact that the observation of
one output word provides half of the current internal state can be exploited and leads to an
attack with time-complexity O(2n4 ) [6]. It follows that such a generator must use a more
complex filtering function (probably with fewer output bits). But, the criteria for designing
such a function remain unknown and must be investigated if we want such ciphers to be a
good alternative to LFSR-based stream ciphers.
3.2 S-boxes for block ciphers
The development of cryptanalysis in the last twenty years has led to the definition of some
design criteria for block ciphers. These criteria correspond to some mathematical properties
of the round function which is used in an iterated block cipher. They essentially concern the
confusion part of the round function, usually named S(ubstitution)-box. Indeed, the S-boxes
are usually the only nonlinear operations performed in a block cipher. Their roles aim at
concealing any algebraic structure that may appear in the system. Because most properties
involved are invariant under composition with a linear transformation, the properties of the
S-boxes used directly provide results on the entire round function for some attacks.
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3.2.1 Resistance to differential attacks
Differential cryptanalysis successfully applies when the reduced cipher (i.e., the cipher ob-
tained by removing the final round of the original block cipher) has a derivative which is not
uniformly distributed. This means that two inputs with fixed difference lead to outputs whose
difference takes a certain value with high probability. Therefore, a necessary security condi-
tion is that the output distributions of all derivatives of the S-boxes, x 7→ S(x + a) + S(x),
must be close to the uniform distribution. The relevant parameter for an S-box with n inputs
and m outputs is then
δS = max
a,b6=0
#{x ∈ Fn2 , S(x + a) + S(x) = b} .
A general trivial bound is δS ≥ 2n−m. The functions achieving this bound are called perfect
nonlinear functions or bent functions [63]. Such functions only exist when n is even and
m ≤ n2 [65]. A major drawback is that these optimal functions are not balanced, and it
may be a weakness to use non-invertible S-boxes in a block cipher (see e.g. [71]). When the
number of output bits of the S-box is the same as the number of inputs (this is the case in
many ciphers), we have an improved bound, δS ≥ 2, and the functions achieving this second
bound are called almost perfect nonlinear (APN) [68]. In both cases, i.e., m ≤ n2 and n = m,
the bounds are known to be tight. But, when the number of output bits lie between n2 and
n, the lowest possible value that can be achieved for δS is still unknown.
Most works on optimal S-boxes with respect to differential attacks focus on the case where
m = n.
A major open problem concerning APN S-boxes is that we do not know any APN permu-
tation with an even number of variables. Actually, it is conjectured that, for any permutation
S of Fn2 with n even, we have δS ≥ 4. This statement is proved for some particular cases,
most notably for power functions [23] and for functions of degree 2 [67, 48]. As an example,
the AES S-box satisfy δS = 4. Invertible S-boxes of 8 variables with δS = 4 which are not
equivalent to a power mapping have also been found by perturbation techniques [40]. The
fact that no APN permutation is known for an even number of variables led the designers
of MISTY to choose functions of an odd number of variables. Therefore, it would be very
important to solve this open problem.
Some infinite families on APN S-boxes have been exhibited [44, 66, 51, 38, 37], but most
of the known optimal functions are equivalent (under composition by an affine mapping) to
a power function, x 7→ xs over F2n . A few infinite families of APN mappings which are not
equivalent to a power function have been exhibited for the first time in [10, 9]. However,
none of them seems to have a significant advantage over power functions (e.g. regarding their
algebraic immunity). The use of an S-box which is linearly equivalent to a power mapping may
intuitively appear as a weakness because all its outputs are affinely equivalent. However, the
relevance of this property remains unclear since no attack based on this structural property
has been mounted.
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3.2.2 Resistance to linear attacks
The resistance to linear attacks involves the nonlinearity of the S-box, which corresponds to
the lowest nonlinearity achieved by a linear combination of its components:
NL(S) = 2n−1 − 1
2
L(S) ,
where L(S) denotes the highest magnitude appearing in the Walsh spectrum of all linear
combinations of S. For an S-box with n inputs and m outputs, we have L(S) ≥ 2n2 . The
functions for which equality holds are the perfect nonlinear functions, i.e., the functions which
also provide an optimal resistance to differential attacks [63, 65]. This bound is not achieved
when the number of outputs exceeds n2 . For m = n, we know that L(S) ≥ 2
n+1
2 , and the
functions achieving the bound are called almost bent (AB) [76, 22]. Such optimal functions
obviously only exist for an odd number of variables. When n is even, some functions with
L(S) = 2n2 +1 are known and it is conjectured that this value is the minimum [75, 39]. Here
again, nothing is known when the number of output bits lie between n2 and n.
When the number of inputs and outputs are the same, the quantities which measure the
resistance to both attacks are also related. Actually, Chabaud and Vaudenay [22] proved that
any AB function is APN. The converse does not hold, and an additional condition on the
Walsh coefficients on an APN function is required for ensuring optimal resistance to linear
attacks [14].
Almost bent functions are optimal combinatorial objects. Therefore, they appear in sev-
eral areas of telecommunications: this property is related to metric properties of some linear
codes, especially of binary cyclic codes with two zeros. Almost bent power functions also cor-
respond to pairs of maximum-length sequences with preferred cross-correlation (see e.g. [12]).
As previously mentioned, only a few optimal S-boxes regarding differential and linear at-
tacks are known, and all existing constructions lead to functions which present a very strong
algebraic structure. An important research direction in the future would be to further inves-
tigate the construction of optimal or of sub-optimal functions with respect to both criteria.
3.2.3 Resistance to algebraic attacks
The idea of mounting algebraic attacks on block ciphers have been proposed by Courtois and
Pieprzyk [32]. The feasibility of these attacks on concrete ciphers is still questionable since
the attacker needs to solve a system of algebraic equations with a huge number of variables.
However, it seems suitable to use S-boxes which have a high algebraic immunity. Algebraic
attacks on block ciphers rely on the same principle as the attacks on stream ciphers. They
exploit the existence of low-degree relations between the inputs and the outputs of the S-box,
i.e., for an S-box S with n inputs and m outputs, the existence of a function g of low degree d
such that
g(x1, . . . , xn, S1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Sm(x1, . . . , xn)) = 0 ,
where S1, . . . , Sm denote the Boolean components of the S-box. As noted in [3], finding such
a relation of degree d is equivalent to finding an annihilator of degree d for the characteristic
function ΦS of S, which is the Boolean function of (n + m) variables defined by
ΦS(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym) = 1 if and only if yi = Si(x1, . . . , xn), ∀i .
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Therefore, all previously mentioned results on the algebraic immunity of Boolean functions
can be applied here. For instance, an S-box with n inputs and m outputs has relations of
degree at most d if
d
∑
i=0
(
n + m
i
)
> 2n .
Thus, it appears that low degree relations exist when the number of variables of the S-box
is small, which is usually the case because of implementation constraints. For instance, any
S-box with 8 inputs and 8 outputs, such as the AES S-box, has relations of degree 3. It is
well-known that the AES S-box, which is defined by the inverse function over the field with
28 elements (with S(0) = 0) has 39 quadratic relations. Some lower bounds on the general
number of quadratic relations induced by some other classes of almost perfect nonlinear power
functions of n variables have been computed in [24, 31]. An important research direction is
then to find S-boxes with optimal algebraic immunity which oppose a high resistance to
differential and linear attacks. The question of the existence of a potential trade-off between
the algebraic immunity of an S-box and the criteria related to other classical attacks is still
open.
For algebraic attacks on block ciphers, the outputs of the S-box are usually unknown
since they are intermediate variables corresponding to the output bits obtained after each
internal round. Therefore, the degree of the relations in these variables must be low. But,
in some other contexts, the outputs of the S-box are known. We can then allow any degree
in the output variables and only a low degree in the input variables. This situation occurs
for instance when the S-box is used as a filtering or combining function in an LFSR-based
stream cipher. In this case, for an S-box with n inputs and m outputs, there exists a relation
of degree at most d in the input variables (and of any degree in the output variables) if
d
∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
> 2n−m .
In other applications, the suitable degrees in the input and output variables may differ. For
instance, in the context of fast algebraic attacks on stream ciphers, we are interested in finding
algebraic relations induced by the augmented function such that the terms of highest degree
do not depend on the output variables. For mounting a bilinear attack on a Feistel cipher [29],
we are searching for quadratic relations whose quadratic monomials are of the form xiyj only.
For all these cases, similar bounds can be derived by considering that the algebraic relations
correspond to the rows of a given matrix which add up to zero. Each row of the matrix
corresponds to the evaluations on all possible inputs of a suitable monomial in the xi’s and
yj ’s. A trivial bound is directly obtained by noticing that there always exists a subset of
rows which sum up to zero if the number of rows exceed the number of columns. However,
it would be interesting to go further in this analysis. For instance, we need to determine
whether the existence of algebraic relations having these particular forms is related to other
classical criteria.
3.2.4 Resistance to other attacks involving the S-boxes
Other classical attacks on iterated block ciphers have introduced further requirements on the
inherent S-boxes.
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Higher order differential attacks For instance, higher order differential attacks intro-
duced by Knudsen are generalizations of differential attacks in the sense that they rely on some
properties of the higher order derivatives of the S-boxes. More precisely, this kind of attack
can be mounted if the reduced cipher has a k-th order derivative which is constant, for a small
value of k (since the attack requires the knowledge of 2k pairs of plaintexts / ciphertexts). A
natural candidate arises when the reduced cipher, seen as a multivariate polynomial, has a
low degree. Indeed, any (d+1)-th derivative of a function of degree d vanishes. The degree of
the S-box then provides a trivial upper bound on the complexity of higher order differential
cryptanalysis. This bound was directly used by Jakobsen and Knudsen [50] for breaking a
cipher example, whose round function is an almost bent permutation of degree 2. However,
constant higher-order derivatives can sometimes be found even if the round function has a
high degree. For instance, it was shown in [17] that the degree of 2 iterations of the round
function F ◦F grows much slower than deg(F )2 when all Walsh coefficients of F are divisible
by a high power of 2. It is important to note that, by definition, the Walsh coefficients of
an almost bent S-box of n variables are divisible by 2
n+1
2 . Therefore, the use of almost bent
S-boxes may make the cipher vulnerable to other attacks.
Interpolation attack. As shown in [50], the S-boxes used in a block cipher must also have
a high degree when they are seen as a univariate polynomial in F2n [X]. Otherwise, the whole
cipher can be expressed as a univariate polynomial with low degree, whose coefficients can
be found by interpolation from the knowledge of some pairs of plaintexts / ciphertexts. A
more powerful variant of the interpolation attack has been presented by Jakobsen [49]. This
variant applies when the round function is close to a low-degree univariate polynomial. The
relevant cryptographic parameter here is the distance of the round function to the set of all
univariate polynomials over F2n of degree at most d, i.e., the distance to the Reed-Solomon
code of order d (see also [27] for a generalization of this attack).
Other criteria. As for Boolean functions, there exist some structural properties for S-boxes
which are not related to any attack, but which are believed to introduce weaknesses. The
most interesting one is probably the use of S-boxes which correspond to power functions (up
to an affine transformation). Such S-boxes are commonly used because all known optimal
functions with respect to differential and linear attacks lie in this class. But, the intuition
may be that such a strong algebraic property introduces a weakness which could be exploited
by another attack. However, it is difficult to determine which particular characteristics of
power mappings may induce a weakness. The fact that all outputs of such a function are
affinely equivalent has been pointed out in [43]. It is even recommended in [47] that an S-box
must lie as far as possible from the set of all power mappings. Therefore, it seems essential
to try to mount an attack based on these structural properties in order to determine whether
they must be avoided or not.
3.2.5 Construction of S-boxes with low implementation complexity
The implementation complexity of the S-box must be taken into account for many applica-
tions, e.g. for hardware dedicated block ciphers. The solution used in most block ciphers
consists in building a large S-box by concatenating several copies of the same small S-box.
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For instance, the 128-bit substitution layer in the AES corresponds to 16 copies of an 8 × 8
function. This construction has many advantages from the implementation point of view:
it allows hardware implementations of the S-boxes, and it also requires a reduced amount
of memory when the S-box is implemented by a lookup table, for instance on super-scalar
processors.
However, the construction by concatenation has several drawbacks. First, it originates
some multi-set properties, leading to the so-called integral attacks. Then, a substitution layer
obtained by this construction cannot achieve optimal resistance to statistical attacks. For
instance, for the AES with a 128-bit key, the 128-bit transformation corresponding to the AES
substitution layer achieves the following parameters: its maximum linear probability (MLP)
and its maximum differential probability (MDP) are both equal to 2−6. These parameters
are not optimal: for instance, the inverse function over F2128 leads to MLP = MDP = 2
−126.
The construction by concatenation has also an impact on higher order differential attacks:
the AES S-box layer has degree 7 and its Walsh coefficients are all divisible by 232. These are
the best values which can be obtained by concatenating sixteen 8-bit bijective S-boxes, but
degree 127 and a divisibility of 4 only of the Walsh spectrum can be achieved for a general
128-bit bijective mapping [17].
Similarly, the use of such a concatenation has an impact on the number of quadratic mul-
tivariate equations in the input and output bits of the S-box layer. Each 8-bit S-box in the
AES provides 39 linearly independent quadratic equations, leading to 624 equations for the
128-bit S-box layer. As a comparison, the inverse function over F2128 provides 639 linearly
independent quadratic equations [31]. Moreover, any substitution layer obtained by concate-
nating smaller S-boxes provides a sparse algebraic system. For instance, in the AES, each
quadratic equation involves at most 16 of the 256 variables. This property may affect the
performance of the underlying algebraic attack.
Therefore, finding other constructions of large S-boxes with a low implementation com-
plexity appears as a major open issue.
3.3 Future directions
Many important open questions arise when a designer needs to choose suitable Boolean func-
tions or S-boxes for a stream cipher or for a block cipher. Besides all previously mentioned
research directions, it appears to be important to provide tools to help the designer. For
this purpose, the ECRYPT working group on Open research areas in symmetric cryptography
has started to build a database containing the best known Boolean functions and S-boxes of
different sizes for the known design criteria.
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4 Provable security in symmetric cryptography
This section briefly outlines available provable security results and proof techniques applicable
to symmetric algorithms and perspectives for this important research topic.
The notion of provable security is to be understood here in a broad sense. Like in asym-
metric cryptography, reduction techniques allow to relate in a reasonably general adversarial
model the security of an encryption or message authentication algorithm to the conjectured
intractability of a well-defined mathematical problem. However, unlike in asymmetric cryp-
tography, the security proofs in symmetric cryptography usually do not reduce to a math-
ematical problem from number theory, but often reduce to a cryptographic assumption on
some underlying component, or are based on a hypothesis regarding the category of attacks
that the adversary is allowed to use. Until now nearly all known examples of reductions to
number theoretical assumptions are of theoretical rather than practical interest for symmetric
algorithms (e.g. stream ciphers), and it is a major open issue whether there exist practical
symmetric algorithms presenting implementation complexity and performance characteristics
close to those of the AES for which global reduction theorems can be proved.
Therefore, we will also consider proofs of more partial aspects of security of a symmetric
algorithm, i.e. which only validate the resistance of a cipher to a specific category of attacks
(e.g. linear or differential cryptanalysis), or only validate one level of a cryptographic con-
struction (e.g. a block cipher structure, a mode of operation) under the assumption that
the underlying level of the construction is itself secure as done in the so-called Luby-Rackoff
security model. However, proofs that a cryptographic component of a cipher, e.g. an S-
box, a Boolean functions involved in a stream cipher, a linear permutation involved in an
SP network, etc., satisfies some cryptographic criteria (low associated differential and linear
probabilities, high nonlinearity, MDS property, etc.) will be considered outside the scope of
this section.
One of the most impressive achievements in cryptology in the last twenty years is the proof
of a chain of reduction theorems relating the main categories of primitives encountered in
symmetric cryptology. This chain starts from the conjectured existence of one way functions
(OWF) or alternatively from the conjectured existence of one way permutations (OWP) 1
and successively relates by reduction theorems, i.e. by constructing at each step a new object
whose insecurity would imply the insecurity of the previous object.
(1) OWFs (or OWPs) to Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) which represent
the keystream generation part of stream ciphers [2, 5, 8];
(2) PRNGs to Pseudo-Random Function Generators (PRFs), using the so-called binary
tree construction [4];
1A one way function (OWF) can be informally defined as an easy to compute but hard to invert function.
In the sequel we will only consider strongly one way functions F , i.e. functions such that there exists no
inversion algorithm allowing, when given an F output value y corresponding to an uniformly drawn input
value x, to return a preimage x′ of y (equal or not to x) with a probability greater than a non negligible
amount ε (e.g. greater than the inverse of a polynomial function of the input size in the polynomial security
model). The existence of OWFs represents a basic assumption in cryptography since computational security
based cryptology would collapse otherwise. Numerous candidate one way functions have been identified and
are used as building blocks in numerous cryptographic designs.
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(3) PRFs to Pseudo-Random Permutation Generators (PRPs) which can be seen as an
idealisation of block ciphers or functions associated with modes of operation of block
ciphers [9].
Applications of the above reduction theorems are not restricted to the area of crypto-
logic foundations, but also include proofs of security for fully instantiated algorithms: some
provable security results related to (1) are applicable to the construction of stream ciphers
whose security is equivalent to the conjecture that a candidate one-way function is indeed
one-way, and some provable security results related to (3) allow to validate the security of
block cipher construction methods (e.g. the use of the Feistel construction) or to validate
modes of operation in the Luby-Rackoff security model.
Examples of other less closely related, but quite important achievements in provable se-
curity for symmetric cryptography include the following.
• Wegman and Carter’s message authentication paradigm, which is based upon the con-
cept of universal hash function families and allows to construct a provably secure mes-
sage authentication scheme indexed by a short secret key provided that a secure stream
cipher is available.
• Proofs of resistance of some block ciphers against differential or linear attacks exploiting
the existence of high probability differentials or linear hulls, by K. Nyberg and L. Knud-
sen, and developed later on by K. Aoki et al. This proof technique was in particular
applied to validate the resistance of the MISTY block cipher designed by Matsui and
its variant KASUMI (used in UMTS) to differential cryptanalysis.
• Vaudenay’s decorrelation theory, which can be considered both as a tool to validate
cryptographic constructions in the Luby-Rackoff model, and has thus strong connection
with (3) above, and as a tool for proving the resistance of some block ciphers against
statistical attacks of order 2 such as differential or linear attacks, or more generally
against statistical attacks of order d. This proof technique was in particular applied to
validate the resistance of the AES candidate DFC block cipher against differential and
linear cryptanalysis.
• Merkle and Damgard’s proofs that an iterated n-bit hash function based on successive
invocations of an (n+m)-bit to n-bit compression function is collision free if the under-
lying compression function is collision free, and their transposition to the proof that the
MAC function associated with the HMAC construction [1] (which allows to convert an
iterated hash function to a MAC) is secure if the hash function is collision-free and the
underlying compression function behaves as a strong (unforgeable) fixed length MAC
of its m-bit input when keyed by its n-bit input.
In the rest of this section, we consider some open issues arising from these different research
directions.
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4.1 Stream ciphers and pseudo-random generators
In this section we only consider synchronous stream ciphers, and not self-synchronised stream
ciphers, where the keystream generation depends on the ciphertext.
Self-synchronised stream ciphers were used in contexts where data loss was less annoying
that latency. Therefore the encrypted message was sent in a long stream, and it was important
to be able to resynchronise the decryption even if part of the encrypted stream was lost. Self-
synchronised stream ciphers are no longer used today, at least in industry. Instead of sending
an encrypted message in a long stream, messages are now split into a number of packets that
are acknowledged by the receiver, and if some packet is lost it is resent.
For performance reasons, stream ciphers are often used for encryption of packets, but
block ciphers are also suited to this application. This explains why A5/1 (a stream cipher)
has been superseded by A5/3 (a block cipher) for cell phone encryption. Stream ciphers used
in the encryption of packets have three inputs: the message, the secret key, and the packet
number. They operate in two separate steps: first, the secret key and the packet number are
used to generate the keystream sequence. Then, the keystream sequence obtained is bitwise
combined with the plaintext by a XOR and the result is the ciphertext. Most studies of
provable security for stream ciphers neglect the packet number.
Pseudo-random stream generation. Stream ciphers encrypt data in two separate steps.
The first step does not involve the plaintext data: the n-bit secret key k (which is assumed to
be uniformly drawn from {0, 1}n) is expanded into an m-bit keystream sequence z = G(k) =
(zi)i=1···m. In the second step, the obtained keystream sequence is bitwise combined with
the binary sequence (xi)i=1···m representing the plaintext to provide the ciphertext sequence
(yi = xi ⊕ zi)i=1···m 2. Since encryption is involutive, the decryption algorithm operates in
the same way as the encryption algorithm.
Stream ciphers represent a generalization of the well known one-time pad encryption
method, which can be described as the particular case where the first encryption step is the
identity function, i.e. where the keystream sequence is a perfect random sequence. It is
well known (and easy to prove) that the one time pad provides unconditional security: the
ciphertext provides strictly no information about the plaintext, even to an adversary with
unbounded computing resources. The price to pay for this provable unconditional security,
namely the fact that the length of the clear text should not exceed the key length, makes it
impractical for most applications.
From now on, we will only consider stream ciphers which are required to still provide com-
putational security beyond the unicity distance where unconditional security is compromised.
For that purpose, one requires that the keystream generation function G be a strong pseudo-
random number generator (PRNG), allowing to expand a short n-bit seed uniformly drawn
from {0, 1}n (the key k) into a longer m-bit (m > n) key stream sequence z = G(k) ∈ {0, 1}m
in such a way that the probability distribution of z = G(k) be computationally indistin-
guishable with a probability better than a negligible bound ε (by means of a computationally
2These definitions can be trivially generalized to situations where the key symbols and the plaintext,
keystream and ciphertext sequences are chosen from another finite alphabet than {0, 1} and where the binary
addition mod 2 is replaced by any group law over this alphabet
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feasible testing algorithm) from the uniform distribution Um over {0, 1}m. It is easy to see
that if this condition is satisfied, then the stream cipher associated with the PRNG G is
secure, i.e. the probability for an adversary to guess any a priori unknown information about
one encrypted plaintext (resp. about the plaintexts of q encryptions with independent keys)
is bounded over by ε (resp q · ε).
The full formalization of the above definitions has so far mainly been done in an asymp-
totic uniform security model, i.e. one considers families of objects (e.g. generators) indexed
by a security parameter (say the key size) and increasing input and output sizes polynomial
in the security parameter instead of one single object with fixed input and output size, com-
puting resources are modelled as polynomial probabilistic Turing machines and a probability
is considered as negligible if it is lower than the inverse of any monomial function of the
security parameter for sufficiently large values of the security parameter. This has turned
out to be useful for establishing complexity-theoretic results about the existence (under some
conditions) of cryptographic objects like PRNGs, but the validity of this approach is more
questionable when it comes to analyzing the security of constructions used in actual ciphers,
with fixed parameter values. Fortunately a large fraction of the known provable security
results can be formulated both in an asymptotic and a non-asymptotic model.
Proofs of security established so far allow to construct pseudorandom generators whose
security can be reduced to the one-wayness of an underlying function involved in the con-
struction: typically one shows that if the underlying function is one way, then the resulting
pseudorandom generator is secure, i.e. its output distribution is computationally indistin-
guishable 3 from the uniform law Um). The concept of a hardcore predicate (or hardcore bit)
for a one-way function emerged as a key tool for such constructions. A hardcore bit b(x) for
a function F can be informally defined as a computable Boolean function of {0, 1}n such that
for a randomly chosen F input value x, b(x) be computationally difficult to predict based
on the mere knowledge of y = F (x) with a success probability better than 1/2 + ε for non
negligible ε. Security proofs for PRNGs were the focus of an intensive research activity that
was initiated in the early 80’s by seminal papers by Shamir [11], Blum and Micali [2], and
Yao [12].
This research developed primarily in two strongly interacting directions, namely generic
and specific PRNG constructions and associated reduction theorems.
Generic, and specific, reduction theorems. These provide constructions involving po-
tentially any one-way permutation, or any one-way function. Only some of these constructions
are efficient and applicable to the design of practical stream ciphers.
A useful result when it comes to characterizing secure PRNGs is the proof by Yao in [12]
that a PRNG G is secure (i.e. its output distribution is computationally indistinguishable
from the uniform distribution) if and only if its output passes the next bit test, i.e. if for any
bit position i ∈ {1, · · ·m} no computable test allows to predict the output bit zi of a random
3Two probability distributions D1 and D2 over {0, 1}m are said to be computationally indistinguishable
if given any computable testing algorithm T which on input value z ∈ {0, 1}m produces an output value 0 =
reject or 1 = accept, the acceptance probabilities of T for random input values z respectively drawn according
to the probability distributions D1 and D2 differ in absolute value by a distinguishing probability bounded
over by a negligible amount ε
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generator output z = G(x) based on the mere knowledge of the prefix bits zj , j < i of G(x)
(if any).
An important tool for generic PRNG constructions is represented by results on the exis-
tence of hardcore bits for one-way functions. It has been established by Yao [12] that if there
exists a one-way function, then this function can be used to construct a modified function
which is still one-way and for which there exists a hardcore predicate. A few years later,
Goldreich and Levin established [5] the more simple and practical result that if F is any
n-bit to m-bit one-way function, then the 2n-bit Boolean function b(x‖r) = x · r (where x · r
represents the scalar product of x and a random value r of {0, 1}n ) is a hardcore bit for the
2n-bit to m + n-bit function F ′ : x‖r 7→ F (x)‖r, and F ′ is still one way.
A general methodology for constructing an n-bit to m-bit PRNG is the iterated invocation
of an n-bit to n + 1-bit function G which has the property that the output distribution of G
is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n+1. Such a function G is easy
to construct if there exists an n-bit to n-bit one-way function F such that
(1) there exists a hardcore bit b(x) for F ;
(2) the output distribution of F is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform dis-
tribution Un.
The function G defined by x 7→ x||b(x) satisfies conditions (1) and (2).
A direct application of the above methodology is the reduction theorem allowing to con-
struct a secure PRNG based upon any one-way permutation (OWP). A technically more
difficult theorem (whose proof is based upon a much less practical construction) states that
a secure PRNG can be constructed based upon any one way function (OWF). This theorem
was established by Impagliazzo, Levin, Luby and Hastad [8]. It represents a major theoretical
result but its practical applicability to stream cipher designs is unclear.
Looking at the instantiation of this work, we turn our attention to using specific candidate
one-way functions.
Most of the known provable stream cipher constructions proposed so far use the hardcore
predicate results, i.e. they iterate a candidate one-way function and output a hardcore bit
at each iteration. The main candidate one-way functions that are used are the Discrete
Logarithm function, the Quadratic Residuosity and the RSA function. Some of the proposed
constructions are:
• The Blum-Micali construction, which uses the fact that under the strong Discrete Loga-
rithm assumption the most significant bit of x is a hardcore predicate for the exponential
function.
• The Blum-Blum-Shub construction which uses the hardness of the parity of number xi
with xi+1 = x
2
i mod n where n is a Blum number. The reduction is done under the
Quadratic Residuosity assumption.
• The Alexi-Chor-Goldreich-Schnorr construction which is based on the RSA assumption.
70 ECRYPT — European NoE in Cryptology
However, even with some improvements (e.g. outputting up to log(n) bits instead of 1), all
of these constructions are very slow, because the number of bits output for a single iteration
is very small, and every iteration has high complexity (O(n2) or more). Some more practical
constructions have been proposed and in these two constructions, more bits are output for
each single iteration:
• The Syndrome Decoding Algorithm [3], which uses the NP-hardness of the Syndrome
Decoding Problem.
• BMGL [7], submitted to the NESSIE project, built around the Rijndael block cipher.
Some open areas of interest include the following.
• The transposition of known results to a non-asymptotic security model.
• Finding more constructive and tighter reductions (as is done in asymmetric cryptogra-
phy).
• Identifying suitable intractable problems which might lead to more practical provable
PRNGs.
• Security proofs allowing to output more than log(n) bits at each iteration (as is done
in BMGL).
• Extending available security proofs for PRNGs to stream ciphers with an additional
input parameter, namely an initialization value (IV).
4.2 Partial validation in the Luby-Rackoff security model
A key dependent cryptographic function such as a block cipher or a mode of operation of
a block cipher can be viewed as a random function or permutation generator allowing one
to derive an n-bit to m-bit function or permutation from a randomly selected key value.
It is generally defined using a recursive construction process. Each step of the recursion
consists of deriving a random function (or permutation) F from r previously defined random
functions (or permutations) f1, · · · , fr , and can be represented by a relation of the form
F = Φ(f1, · · · , fr).
One of the strongest security requirements one can put on such a random function or
permutation generator F is that F be impossible to distinguish with a non-negligible success
probability from a perfect random function or permutation F ∗ uniformly drawn from the set of
all functions (or permutations) with the same input and output sizes, even if a probabilistic
testing algorithm A of unlimited power is used for that purpose and if the number q of
adaptively chosen queries of A to the random instance of F or F ∗ to be tested is large.
It is generally not possible to prove indistiguishability properties for “real life” cryptologic
random functions and large numbers of queries, because this would require a key length that
is far too long. However, it is often possible to prove or disprove that if a random function
F encountered at a given level of a cryptologic function construction is related to random
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functions encountered at the lower recursion level by a relation of the form f = Φ(f1, · · · , fr),
then if we replace the actual f1 to fr random functions of the cipher by independent perfect
random functions or permutations f∗1 to f
∗
r (or, in a more sophisticated version of the same
approach, by f ′1 to f
′
r functions which are sufficiently indistinguishable from f
∗
1 to f
∗
r ), then
the resulting modified random function F is indistinguishable from a random function (or
permutation). This provides a useful method for assessing the soundness of block cipher
constructions.
For instance, in the case of a three-round Feistel construction, a well-known theorem
first proved by Luby and Rackoff [9] provides upper bounds on the |p − p∗| advantage of
any testing algorithm A in distinguishing the 2n-bit random permutation F = Ψ(f∗1 , f
∗
2 , f
∗
3 )
deduced from three independent perfect random functions f∗1 , f
∗
2 and f
∗
3 from a perfect random
2n-bit permutation F ∗ with q adaptively chosen queries to the tested instance of F or F ∗.
This advantage is less than q
2
2n . Another example is for the F = ΦCBCMAC(f) CBC-MAC
construction allowing to derive a tn-bit to n-bit message authentication function from chained
invocations of an n-bit to n-bit function f . It was shown by Bellare, Kilian and Rogaway that
if q2t2 ≤ 2n+1, then the advantage of any testing algorithm A in distinguishing the random
function F = ΦCBCMAC(f
∗) derived from a perfect nt -bit to n-bit random function using q
adaptively chosen queries is less than 3 q
2t2
2n+1
.
In proofs of security in the Luby-Rackoff model, one wants to upper bound the probability
of any algorithm to distinguish whether a given fixed ϕ function is an instance of a F =
Φ(f∗1 , f
∗
2 , .., f
∗
r ) random function or an instance of the perfect n-bit to m-bit random function
F ∗, using less than q queries to ϕ.
Let A be any distinguishing algorithm of unlimited power that, when input with a ϕ
function (which can be modelled as an “oracle tape” in the probabilistic Turing Machine
associated with A) selects a fixed number q of distinct chosen or adaptively chosen input
values xi (the queries), obtains the q corresponding output values yi = F (xi), and based on
these results outputs 0 or 1. Denote by p (resp by p∗) the probability for A to answer 1
when applied to a random instance of F (resp of F ∗). We want to find upper bounds on the
advantage AdvA(F, F
∗) = |p − p∗| of A in distinguishing F from F ∗ with q queries.
As first pointed out by Patarin [10], the best advantage AdvA(F, F
∗) of any distinguishing
algorithm A in distinguishing F from F ∗ is entirely determined by the q-ary transition prob-
abilities Pr[x
F7→ y] associated with each x = (x1, · · · , xq) q-tuple of pairwise distinct n-bit
values and each y = (y1, · · · , yq) q-tuple of corresponding m-bit values.
4.3 Partial proof techniques for hash functions and MACs
Two important areas of provable security have involved the following approaches.
• The Merkle-Damgard and HMAC constructions.
The approach here is to show that collisions on the whole VIL (variable input length)
function (resp. forgery on the whole function) implies collisions (resp. collision or
forgery) on the underlying FIL (fixed input length) compression function.
• The Carter-Wegman MAC construction.
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Informally, we let H denote a family of non-cryptographic (e.g. linear) n-bit to m-bit
hash functions h. H is said to be a 2-universal family of (non-cryptographic) hash func-
tions if, and only if, given any two fixed distinct input values x and x′, the (h(x), h(x′))
pair associated with a randomly selected h ∈ H is distributed according to the uniform
law over {0, 1}2m.
Such 2-universal families of non-cryptographic functions are not only applicable to the
design of unconditionally secure authentication codes (allowing to authenticate one sin-
gle message, while not revealing any information about the authentication code associ-
ated with any other message, but also, when combined with a secure stream cipher, to
provide a provably secure n-bit to m-bit MAC allowing to authenticate an unbounded
number of messages. In the latter case, the MAC key consists of the selected h func-
tion (which is kept secret as in the first case, but is used to authenticate all messages
unlike in the first case) and the stream cipher key K, and the MAC process consists in
computing h(M) and encrypting this value under key K using a fresh m-bit keystream
sequence generated by the stream cipher. The requirements on families of hash func-
tions can be relaxed while still providing some provable unforgeability properties for the
associated MAC: it was shown in [6] that a sufficient condition is that H be a so-called
∆ − ε-universal family of hash functions (where ε represents a negligible probability).
Some interesting open issues might include the following.
• Finding alternative constructions for fixed input length compression functions.
• Exploring new applications of families of non-cryptographic hash functions.
• Further explorations of the interplay between different techniques; for instance view-
ing decorrelation modules as a generalization of Carter-Wegman families of non-
cryptographic hash functions.
4.4 Provable resistance against classes of attacks
Constructions or design methodologies that help guarantee resistance to certain types of at-
tacks are very important. These have been particularly useful in understanding the limitations
of differential and linear cryptanalysis.
• The Nyberg-Knudsen bound relating the maximum average input to output differential
transition probability DPmax for an r-round, r ≥ 3 (resp. r ≥ 4) Feistel scheme
based upon r permutations f (resp. r not necessarily one to one functions) to the
pmax coefficients for the underlying f function. The initial upper bound (2p
2
max) was
improved to (p2max) by Aoki et al, who also generalized the maximum average input to
output linear transition coefficient LPmax for a r-round Feistel scheme (same results)
and for the variant of the Feistel scheme represented by the MISTY construction. By
applying these results at various levels of the nested construction of the MISTY block
cipher, Matsui has derived upper bounds guaranteeing that MISTY is resistant against
linear and differential cryptanalysis. A similar result can be derived for KASUMI.
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• Vaudenay’s decorrelation theory and resulting constructions of ciphers offering some
provable immunity against attacks of order 2 (or of even larger order for some construc-
tions such as the one proposed for the PEANUT cipher). This technique was applied to
validate the resistance of the DFC algorithm against linear and differential cryptanalysis
and more generally attacks of order 2. In block ciphers such as PEANUT and DFC,
a new subkey embedding technique involving decorrelation modules instead of subkey
addition followed by a key-independent S-box is applied.
• Direct proofs in particular provable bounds in the number of ”active” S-boxes (at least
25 boxes for the 4-round AES) could be also derived for specific ciphers, and allow to
derive upper bounds on maximum probabilities of differential and linear characteristics.
Bounds on maximum input to output differential and linear transition probabilities
(named differentials and linear hulls by some authors) are technically more difficult
to derive than bounds on linear or differential characteristics where the differential or
linear behaviour is specified at each round, but such bounds have also been established
for AES.
Some interesting open issues might include the following.
• Proofs that exploit the deviation of the maximum average input to output differential or
linear transition probabilities DPmax and LPmax (the average being taken over possible
key values) do not formally preclude the existence of high probability differentials or
linear input to output transition probabilities for a large fraction of key values or even
all key values (provided that the high probability differentials or linear hulls are not the
same for the various possible key values).
• Can provable resistance against other classes of attacks, such as algebraic attacks, be
provided?
• Can we provide new design methodologies based upon partially provable constructions
as done in MISTY, KASUMI, and DFC?
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5 Industrial Needs
Cryptography is a science and a technique and its ultimate goal is applicability. The conver-
sion of scientific results on cryptography into actual products is performed mostly by private
companies and public organisations who wish to incorporate security features within various
applications. These organisations are collectively described as “the industry” and the pur-
pose of this section is to provide a rough sketch of what are their current needs in the area
of symmetric cryptography; in other words, what are the problems which the industry would
like the researchers to tackle most immediately.
These needs can be sorted into the following categories:
• standards;
• secure protocols;
• high-performance specialised algorithms;
• random number generators;
• implementation issues.
We will now review what these categories are, what already exists and what is still eagerly
expected by the industry.
5.1 Standardization
A variety of standardization challenges are presented.
5.1.1 Data representation
Scientific research on cryptography operates on abstract, mathematical objects such as inte-
gers or elements in a finite field. Industrial applications are more concerned about sending
and receiving streams of bits or bytes4. For proper interoperability, an algorithm must be
specified completely and unambiguously, which means that two distinct and independent im-
plementers should be able to produce the exact same output with the same input without
resorting to “common knowledge”. For instance, byte ordering in the representation of an
integer value (the “endianness” problem) must be specified.
For symmetric cryptography, what algorithm (scientific) descriptions most often lack is
a precise definition of the ordering of bits within a byte, and the ordering of bytes within a
multi-byte integer value. Some standards, such as the AES [4] and SHS [3] do it correctly:
they take great pain to define bit and byte ordering precisely.
Without such a precise definition, any algorithm specification is next to useless for the
industry; if the algorithm is really needed (for instance, it has very good properties which
no properly specified existing algorithm provides), the industrial organisation will fill in the
blanks with its own proprietary definitions, and thus is interoperability forfeit.
4We use here “byte” to designate an 8-bit quantity; “octet” could equally have been used.
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5.1.2 Responsibility
Apart from being clear and precise, a good standard must be accepted and maintained. What
this means is that the industry will be reluctant to use a standard unless it originates from
a source which is both generally considered as authoritative, and also responsible for the
production and publication of amendments when necessary.
For instance, the FIPS publications by the NIST [11] (such as AES and SHS) fit this
description well. They are backed by the US government, and as such their use is mandated
throughout many government applications; conformance to these standards can be qualified
as a legal obligation. Moreover, the NIST is officially responsible for the contents of the stan-
dards, and must publish revisions when the need arises. Using these standards is economically
justified.
The RFC [8] system is not as good. RFC publication is relatively easy (and free), but most
RFCs are tagged as “informational” which gives no hint on their acceptance and foreseeable
future. Only those RFCs which are related to Internet protocols get a chance to become RFC
“standards”. RFCs are never modified in any way; revisions may be issued but there is no
guarantee of that.
A good example of this is the TLS protocol [15] and the RC4 stream cipher: RC4 is,
technically, a trademark corresponding to a secret algorithm. However, there exists another
algorithm (usually called “alleged RC4” or “Arcfour”) which is not secret and which appears
to be compatible with the official RC4. The “alleged” situation is not satisfactory, hence
a new RFC describing Arcfour was scheduled, and the TLS RFC specifies that Arcfour, as
described in that new document, is compatible with the official RC4. This was stated when
the TLS RFC was written, back in January 1999. However the Arcfour description was never
published and, since nobody is responsible for this document, it cannot be said when, if ever,
Arcfour will be described in a public authoritative reference.
5.2 Secure protocols
Cryptographic algorithms are only bricks which are combined into protocols which provide
some high-level security features. An example of such a protocol is TLS [15], which combines
symmetric encryption, MACs and asymmetric cryptography (key exchange and signature) in
order to provide a confidential authenticated integrity-checked two-way tunnel for arbitrary
byte streams; the underlying medium is any other two-way tunnel for byte streams.
The performance and adequacy of a protocol in a specific situation is highly dependent
on the protocol definition. The regular “standard” protocols are usually high-level and best
suited to Internet-like communications. For small lightweight applications (e.g. embedded
mobile devices), implementers are reluctant to implement TLS or IPsec tunnelling because
they cannot afford a fully functional IP implementation. For these devices special lightweight
protocols must be designed which have provisions for the characteristics of the environment.
5.2.1 Encryption modes
A raw symmetric encryption algorithm is either a block cipher or a stream cipher.
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A block cipher encrypts only one block; to encrypt more, the incoming data must be split
into several blocks and a special mode of encryption used. The most naive mode, the ECB
mode, is known to be weak. The usual recommendation is to use CBC [6] mode, but this has
the following problems:
• CBC needs an initial value which should be added to the encrypted message, thus
enlarging it. If the IV is not added, but inferred from some contextual information,
then some weaknesses may arise depending on the way the IV is computed.
• CBC encrypts data only if it has a length which is a multiple of the block size. If
the underlying data does not have this property then some padding must be applied,
which usually results in further message length increase. Some specific padding modes
have been devised to avoid this problem (e.g. “ciphertext stealing”, aka CTS) but their
security still needs some serious analysis.
• CBC can be interleaved by splitting the input into separate streams in order to improve
throughput (e.g. on Triple DES platforms that have three DES processors). But, in
general, CBC cannot be made parallel. This is a problem for high-bandwidth devices.
Stream ciphers do not have padding issues, but they have security issues when a key
is reused. The usual approach is to include an IV and combine it somehow with the key,
but the actual combining process is rarely described, and can have adverse effects if not
done properly. Moreover, if the IV cannot be derived from some contextual information (e.g.
message sequence number), it must be sent along with the message, which increases its length.
Note that a block cipher in CTR mode is only a way to make a stream cipher from a block
cipher; the IV in this case is the counter initial value.
The industry needs modes of encryption which provide some or all of the following char-
acteristics:
• little or no increase in message size;
• precise and complete specification of proper ways to derive IVs and other values;
• possibility of parallel implementation (for high-speed devices with specific hardware);
• low cost;
• possibility of encryption of very short messages;
• if possible, patent-free.
The ability to encrypt very short messages (less than eight bytes, for instance) without
expansion is a requirement that is important to applications with severe constraints on net-
work bandwidth. What happens from a security perspective when encrypting very short
messages is not well known by public research, and consequently no really secure way to do
it is currently described.
The “cost” of an encryption mode is difficult to express generically, because it depends on
the actual implementation context. On desktop computers and big servers, the cost is mostly
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the raw execution cycle count and the additional pressure on the CPU level 1 cache. On
high-speed hardware platforms with specialized circuits, a more adequate measure is the die
surface needed to achieve some specified bandwidth. On low-power devices (e.g. smartcards),
the most important characteristics are RAM and ROM consumption (RAM is very limited,
but ROM is not very large either – this prohibits the implementation of more than one or
two basic algorithms, and also the use of large pre-computed tables).
5.2.2 Combined encryption and MAC
MACs are used to provide integrity checks on data. Assurance of integrity is needed in most
protocols, in order to thwart active attacks (e.g. modifying data). Although such attacks
are usually much more difficult to perform than simple eavesdropping, they are nonetheless
increasingly important for the industry.
Integrity checks can be used to provide authentication (by knowledge of a shared secret),
independently of any need for confidentiality; however, it is often the case that both con-
fidentiality and data integrity are needed. Some historical applications (e.g. GSM mobile
phones) use encryption for data authentication, by having some conventional data encrypted
and checked. Such a way to build a MAC is known to be insecure in most situations; for
instance, the WEP protocol, designed to protect WiFi connections, was a spectacular failure
in that matter. However, industrial implementers are often reluctant to compute both en-
cryption and MAC, because it basically doubles the cost. This is especially true for low-power
mobile devices, which have limited computing and electrical power.
Therefore there is a clear need for modes of operation which combine the functions of
encryption and MACs, and which at the same time have the desirable characteristics identified
in the previous section (low message length increase, possibility of parallel computation,...).
Recently, several new modes have been proposed, such as CWC [10], CCM [16], EAX [1]
or OCB [17]. It should be noted that those new modes with the best performance are not
patent-free.
5.2.3 Hash functions
A good hash function must have specific properties such as collision resistance. Although
other candidates have been proposed, the most used nowadays derive from the MD family5.
MD4 [12] is considered as broken, and its successors MD5 [13], SHA-0 and SHA-1 are also
technically broken. Some functions in the SHA family [3] (SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512)
are still considered secure, but the new results on SHA-0 and SHA-1 raise some concerns
about the whole family.
Moreover, implementing both a block cipher and a hash function in a limited low-power
device (e.g. a smartcard) can be troublesome, due to hard limitations on the ROM size, or
die surface. It is conceivable to use a key-agile block cipher as a hash function by using the
data as private key, with some chaining and padding; however, this problem has not been
well studied, and has been the subject of only limited standardization (see ISO/IEC 10118-
2 [9]). Such a construction also seems to exercise some security properties of the block cipher,
5We consider here MD4, MD5 and the various SHA-*; MD2 is structurally completely different.
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properties which are seldom considered as important enough to warrant extensive study (e.g.
weak keys).
A generic way to build a secure hash function out of a block cipher would be most appreci-
ated by the industry. This would allow low-power devices to implement more protocols with
less resources; optimised encryption cores could be reused cost-effectively for hashing and,
consequently, MAC computation (with the HMAC [14] construction). Such a construction
would have to be carefully analysed, especially with regards to the actual security properties
which the underlying block cipher would need to provide; the usability of the existing standard
block ciphers (such as the AES [4] or 3DES [5]) should then be assessed. The construction of
a strong hash function from two other ones also appears as an important open problem.
5.3 High-performance specialised algorithms
Some applications need specialised algorithms with very high constraints on performance.
They can be split into roughly two groups:
• high-speed specialised network nodes;
• low-power devices.
5.3.1 High-speed specialised network nodes
We consider here devices which have to handle huge amounts of data; the cryptographic
algorithms they use must be able to process data with a very high bandwidth and very low
latency.
High bandwidth is usually achieved using pipelining, and this is possible so long as the
algorithm itself can be expressed as a circuit. This is true for most, if not all, block ciphers,
but the mode of operation is also important because non-parallel modes such as CBC defeat
pipelining.
Latency cannot be reduced easily. Among block ciphers, those with little diffusion and
many rounds usually imply a high latency because the critical path for each data bit must
traverse many layers. Modern block ciphers are quite good in that respect (but there is always
an application for which the existing method is not “good enough”).
5.3.2 Low-power devices
Low-power devices are applications where cryptography must be applied by hardware which is
very limited in either or both of computational power and electrical resources. Some extreme
applications are RFID tags, which receive very low power through electromagnetic induction,
and have very limited time to compute and send back an answer through radio waves. Other
examples include Bluetooth-enabled devices which are often battery-powered and yet must
sustain radio communications with medium to high data bandwidth.
Most of those applications have to ultimately rely on a general purpose 8-bit or 16-bit
processor, with limited room for code and static data (in ROM) and very limited room for
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mutable data (in RAM). Most modern cryptographic algorithms are designed as a compromise
between high speed on workstations and “generically acceptable performance” for low-power
embedded devices. It so happens that some applications require better than “generically
acceptable”; the industry needs some algorithms which can be relied upon for security and
which perform well on limited platforms. Trust in the security of an algorithm can be achieved
only with thorough peer evaluation; such work has been done for block ciphers (the AES
competition) and for other algorithm types (that’s what the NESSIE project was about) but
not in the specific context of low-power devices.
5.4 Random number generators
Random number generation is difficult, especially for cryptographic purposes, because the
“quality” of the produced random data cannot be measured. Usual statistical tests provide
only a very superficial view of the problem; cryptographic protocols require computational
unpredictability. A random number generator which does not pass successfully the statistical
tests is bad indeed; but a generator which does cannot be thus declared “good”.
A cryptographic random number generator is usually the combination of some seed, which
is a random value provided externally, and a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
which expands that seed into an arbitrarily long stream of bits which are computationally
indistinguishable from random bits. The two main problems are:
• how to make a good seed;
• how to define and implement a good PRNG.
5.4.1 Random seeds
A seed is expressed as a value in a format which is suitable for the purpose of the PRNG
which will be used; it usually is a stream of bits of some specified length (160 bits is common
practice). The seed must have an entropy which is good enough to thwart exhaustive search;
actually, entropy can be defined as the average cost for an exhaustive search to succeed.
Entropy estimation and concentrations are the two main parts of the problem of producing
seeds. Entropy estimation is about measuring how much “unpredictability” can be attached
to the result of measuring a physical event. For instance, a coin flip yields one bit of entropy
– if we assume that the coin is not biased in any way. Entropy sources commonly used vary,
depending on the context:
• In embedded devices such as smartcards, a specialized hardware random number gen-
erator is mandatory; usual generators use a reverse-biased PN junction, implemented
with Zener diodes or a smart combination of transistors.
• In workstations, the physical events are usually precise timings of external interrup-
tions, which correspond to network activity, key strokes, etc. Some processors include
a hardware random number generator which uses a technology equivalent to those used
in smartcards.
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• There are some environment where almost no source of randomness is supplied, for
instance virtual machines used to run applets. Those machines are meant to not have
any randomness. There exists a seed gathering procedure which has been published
for the Java Virtual Machine; the idea is to measure the efficiency of the thread sched-
uler, because that efficiency should depend on the actual load of the host multitasking
machine.
Once random data has been gathered, up to some estimated amount of entropy, that data
must be concentrated in order to produce the seed. The usual way to do this is to input the
entire data into some hash function, whose output will be the seed. This process should be
more carefully analysed from a security point of view; moreover, using a hash function means
that this function must be implemented, which can be a problem for smartcards and other
devices where code size is very limited. The general problem of combining weak physical
random sources and pseudo-random generators in the context of low-power devices appears
as an important issue.
To sum up, the industry has the following needs with regards to seed generation for
cryptographic purposes:
• recipes for gathering random data in various situations;
• accurate estimators for the entropy thus obtained;
• secure ways to concentrate random data, using either a hash function, a block cipher
or a stream cipher.
5.4.2 PRNG
The performance requirements for a PRNG are about the same as for encryption software.
The main difference is that a PRNG has no concept of input bandwidth, just output band-
width. An encryption system which just encrypts an endless stream of zeroes is supposed
to be a good PRNG; similarly, a PRNG can be transformed into a reasonable stream cipher
by using the seed as a key, and combining the output bits with the data using a bitwise
exclusive-or.
Parallelism is still important: it can be exploited by hardware implementations to provide
better output bandwidth; but the same effect can be achieved by including several instances
of the generator, working on several seeds which have been derived from a master seed using
another PRNG.
Another detail which makes PRNG performance easier than encryption performance is
that a PRNG works only for producing random bytes, whereas an encryption system definition
must be wary of the feasibility and performance of the corresponding decryption system.
What the industry needs here is a list of research-approved ways to build a PRNG using
a primitive cryptographic operation, where that operation may be either a hash function, a
block cipher or a stream cipher.
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5.5 Implementation issues
5.5.1 Side-channel attacks
The implementation of cryptographic algorithms is a complex matter, because it deals with
security and this is not easily measured. An implementation which passes all test vectors may
still have security issues related to, for instance, side-channel attacks.
Such attacks exploit some data leakage due to an implementation detail; the usual leak
mediums are timing (algorithm computation time is not independent of the processed data
and secret key) and power consumption (especially for smartcards or other devices which have
an external power supply). Defending against such leaks is not easy, especially with power
consumption for smartcards, because power is provided externally, by a potentially hostile
entity.
Devising generic ways to implement primitive operations in ways which do not leak private
data are an active research area, and much work still needs to be done.
Another usual leak medium is an error reporting channel. For instance, some SSL imple-
mentations using RSA were successfully attacked by Bleichenbacher [2] because those imple-
mentations leaked information about the RSA private key by telling at which point in the
SSL handshake some invalid client message made the computation fail. In brief, precise error
reporting is considered as a good property for most systems, but it can have an adverse effect
on security; the cryptographers should analyse and specify in extensive details where and
what error reporting must be avoided.
5.5.2 Testing
Implementation of symmetric algorithms can be difficult to test. The very nature of the
algorithms implemented (with propagation of errors and avalanche effect) implies that most
flawed implementations are spectacularly faulty: a flawed implementation of AES will usually
give the wrong answer for almost all possible input blocks. However, some algorithms use
operations which can be incorrectly implemented in subtle ways.
One such example is the DFC block cipher [7]. That algorithm includes a modular affine
transform; the reduction is performed modulo 264 + 13. It is relatively difficult to implement
that reduction in a way which is both correct for every input, and also efficient. It is actually
easy to implement it in a way which is correct for most inputs but incorrect with a probability
of 2−64 for random input data. Random test vectors have a very low probability of catching
such an error; specific test vectors must be devised, so as to exercise the specific input values
which may be handled improperly.
Many algorithms use hard-coded look-up tables, where the tables have been chosen for
specific properties. A typing error could corrupt one table entry and remain undetected by
the test vectors if none of them uses that table with the corresponding entry.
In brief, for an algorithm specification to be properly usable by the industry, appropriate
validation procedures (test vectors, mostly) should be included. These procedures must be
defined so as to be very likely to catch the most common implementation errors.
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5.6 Ongoing challenges
Here is a brief summary of the most common industrial needs in symmetric cryptography:
• precise standards actively maintained and supported by large, and if possible public,
organisations;
• new enhanced modes of operations, both for encryption and combined modes which
provide both encryption and authentication;
• precise guidelines on the handling of related data such as IVs;
• specialised algorithms for use in contexts were usual algorithms do not provide adequate
performance, especially low-power embedded devices;
• analysed hardware random number generators with accurate entropy estimators;
• high-performance secure PRNGs based on various algorithms such as block ciphers,
hash functions and stream ciphers;
• guidelines for methods which reduce secret data leakage through side channels;
• proper validation procedures for all standard algorithms;
• migration strategies.
In particular, there is a strong need for high-level constructions (hashing, PRNG, MAC,
etc) which use a block cipher as the unique underlying cryptographic operation. This is for
small, lightweight applications which cannot afford the concurrent implementation of a block
cipher and a hash function.
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